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1. Introduction
Over the years, the economics profession has converged at a set of effective policy rec-
ommendations for a wide variety of policy areas. For example, there is widespread
agreement that externalities can be more efficiently internalized with Pigou taxes than
with command-and-control interventions, and that it is less distortionary to increase
public revenue by eliminating economically unjustified tax deductions and exemptions
than by raising tax rates. Likewise, economists have argued that some fiscal consolida-
tion policies are less harmful than others. In practice, however, these recommendations
are frequently ignored. Instead, policy makers often intervene with strictly less efficient
policy instruments than others that are as readily available. This paper concerns why
such apparently irrational (all else equal) political decisions might arise in a world of
instrumentally rational agents.
To understand this puzzle, we present a dynamic political economy model in which
the government reacts to external shocks by choosing a policy from a given menu of
policies, one of which is unequivocally Pareto dominated by another available alterna-
tive. Indeed, the inefficient policy is not only Pareto dominated by the alternative at
the time of adoption, but in all possible states of the world. Nevertheless, we show that
the inefficient policy intervention can arise naturally from a simple legislative bargain-
ing model without any extraneous frictions or informational asymmetries: it is the very
inefficiency of the policy that makes it appealing to legislators. We further show that
the availability of an inefficient policy instrument, either in addition to or in place of an
efficient policy, may, at least in equilibrium, improve the welfare of all policy makers.
Our legislative bargaining model rests on three characteristics. First, legislative pol-
icy decisions involve two pivotal players. In particular, policy change requires the con-
sent of two veto players who may disagree on when to enact or repeal an intervention.
Second, the status quo policy in a dynamic, multiperiod setting is endogenous: the pol-
icy implemented in one period becomes the status quo in the next. Third, the environ-
ment is subject to shocks across time that affect the state-contingent policy preferences
of the veto players in any period, thereby creating the need for periodic renegotiations.
In a closely related model with only one available policy intervention, Dziuda and
Loeper (2016) observed that the three characteristics described above imply that the
legislator who is pivotal for introducing the intervention is distinct from the legislator
pivotal for repealing it. Consequently, the anticipation of her loss of political influence
makes the legislator pivotal for implementing the intervention less inclined to introduce
it in the first place, fearing that it will be hard to repeal should circumstances change.
Loosely speaking, (Markov perfect) equilibrium behavior involves political gridlock. In
this paper, however, we show that when players can choose not only whether, but also
how, to intervene, the fear of future gridlock can induce an inefficient policy interven-
tion: the veto player can agree on an inefficient policy instrument because the inefficient
instrument will be easier to repeal. As a result, there may be states of nature in which
the more economically efficient intervention is not politically feasible, whereas the less
efficient intervention is approved by both veto players.
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In particular, we characterize conditions under which the inefficient policy instru-
ment is implemented with positive probability in equilibrium. Intuitively, for an inef-
ficient policy response to be chosen by rational legislators, it must be the case that the
inefficiency is sufficiently high (respectively, low) for the more (respectively, less) inter-
ventionist legislator to approve repealing the policy in some states, so that the ease of
repeal offsets the cost of inefficiency for using the inefficient policy in other states. For
any strictly positive level of inefficiency, however, there exist nonpathological distribu-
tions of the state of nature under which legislators use the inefficient instrument in all
equilibria.
The theory links both the political environment and the level of economic stability
to the choice of policy instrument. To see this, fix the level of economic stability and
consider the political environment. Suppose that the ideological distance between the
legislators increases. This increases gridlock, creating room for the use of easily repeal-
able instruments. The relationship between ideological polarization and the use of an
inefficient instrument, however, turns out to be non-monotonic in our framework. The
relative ease of repealing inefficient policies makes such policies attractive interventions
for moderate levels of ideological polarization, but not when ideological polarization is
small or when it is large. To see why, note that when the veto players have sufficiently
similar preferences, they are likely to agree on when to repeal an efficient intervention.
Conversely, when their preferences are sufficiently polarized, they are likely to disagree
on when to repeal either type of policy intervention, in which case the strategic benefit
of an inefficient intervention is too small to outweigh its cost.
To understand the effect of economic volatility, fix the political environment. For
stable economic environments, the current state of nature changes little over time and
any policy intervention can be expected to persist for quite some time. Consequently,
the expected cost of intervening with an inefficient instrument is larger than the option
value of being able to repeal such a policy more readily. Altenatively, if the current eco-
nomic environment is volatile, the state of nature can vary considerably and the possi-
bility of at least one veto player preferring to repeal an intervention relatively quickly can
be high. The relative ease with which inefficient interventions are repealed, therefore,
makes the use of such instruments attractive in this situation.
We show that all veto players can be strictly better off in equilibrium if the inefficient
intervention is available as a policy option. Hence, our paper not only offers a rationale
for the use of inefficient policy instruments, but also implies that they can be beneficial
given the political constraints induced by a collective choice mechanism with multiple
veto players. The less interventionist player benefits from the availability of the inef-
ficient intervention because it is easier to repeal, and the more interventionist player
benefits because it makes policy intervention politically feasible.
The model’s logic can be applied to a variety of settings, including infant industry
protection, environmental regulation, fiscal consolidation, and financial regulation.
Temporary protection of infant industries. Trade theorists (see, e.g., Bardhan 1971)
have argued that in the presence of dynamic learning externalities, protecting an infant
industry from foreign competition (or protecting an established industry from a tem-
porary surge in foreign competition) can raise social welfare. The literature has further
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shown that subsidies are preferable to tariffs because they do not distort consumption
and, because of the double-dividend effect, that tariffs are preferred to quotas and other
nontariff barriers to trade. However, an important condition for these measures to be
socially desirable is that they must be repealed when the industry matures (or when
the temporary increase in foreign competition vanishes), although policy makers do not
know ex ante when that will occur (Melitz 2005). The logic of our model suggests that
the more free-trade-oriented party might prefer to protect the domestic industry with
inefficient nontariff barriers to trade for fear that the more protectionist party will veto
a repeal of more efficient protectionist policies. In fact, since World War II, governments
have increasingly relied on nontariff barriers to trade to adapt trade policies to changes
in trade flows (Bagwell and Staiger 1990).
Environmental regulation. Despite the sometimes considerable differences in per-
spective, economists from left to right tend to recommend Pigou taxes to regulate an ex-
ternality because they are cost-effective, require little information, and offer a “double
dividend” whereby emission taxes generate public revenues that allow governments to
reduce other distortionary taxes.1 It is thus “a mystery,” according to some economists,
why the Republican party in the United States blocked such a market-based policy dur-
ing the Obama administration, since doing so effectively led to the command-and-
control regulation of power plants introduced by that administration in 2015.2 In line
with our model, however, some key Republicans may have anticipated that the admin-
istration would impose some curbs on the energy sector regardless, forcing them to
use inefficient (command-and-control) instruments that would be easier to repeal once
Obama’s term was completed.3 Additionally, at the time of writing, the Republican ad-
ministration is indeed working to repeal the regulations. It is hard to envision that the
same attempt would occur if the intervention to be repealed was an efficient carbon tax
combined with a lump-sum subsidy or a tax offset.
Fiscal consolidation. Consider a country deciding how to consolidate its fiscal policy
after a shock has put its public debt on an unsustainable path. Although its government
can do so along a variety of policy dimensions, we illustrate the logic of our argument
by considering only one possibility, namely whether to focus on increasing revenues or
1Following the seminal paper by Tullock (1967), there is now a large literature on the double dividend.
For a recent survey, see Jorgenson et al. (2013). In part because of the double dividend, all but 4 of 51 promi-
nent economists surveyed in 2011 agreed that a carbon tax would be the less expensive way to reduce car-
bon dioxide emissions (http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=
SV_9Rezb430SESUA4Y).
2See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/energy-environment/us-leaves-the-markets-out-
in-the-fight-against-carbon-emissions.html. While Pigou taxes are also relatively rare internation-
ally, a famous exception is British Columbia, which introduced a carbon tax in 2008. Al-
though initially controversial, the tax has gained support from all important stakeholders thanks to
the rebates in other taxes that the revenues permit (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/business/
does-a-carbon-tax-work-ask-british-columbia.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0).
3Jim Manzi, a prominent conservative commentator on climate change, said openly that “a carbon tax
would be, mostly likely, a one-way door: Once we introduce it we’re stuck with it for a long time. What
if our economic and climate models are too aggressive, and there is no practical economic justification
for emissions reductions [. . . ]. There are very large potential regrets to a carbon tax.” (In “Conservatives,
Climate Change, and the Carbon Tax”, The New Atlantis, 21, 15–25, 2008).
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decreasing outlays. Suppose, as the existing empirical evidence suggests, that a spend-
ing cut is less contractionary and, thus, statically preferred by the policy makers to a tax
increase. In that case, the less interventionist veto player is the veto player ideologically
least inclined to implement a spending cut, that is, the liberal veto player. Our theory
suggests that the liberal veto player may veto the spending cut and support instead a
more costly tax increase in anticipation that once the fiscal situation improves, it will be
easier to convince the conservative player to decrease taxes than to increase spending to
its pre-crisis level.4 Consistent with this logic, there is empirical evidence indicating that
fiscal adjustments based on spending cuts are longer lived than fiscal adjustments based
on tax increases, i.e., the efficient adjustment is more persistent than the inefficient one
(e.g., Alesina et al. 1998, Alesina and Ardagna 2013).5
Financial regulation. Financial regulation tends to respond to financial crises. For
example, after the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Although hailed by many as a
step in the right direction, it is a complex piece of legislation that others consider inef-
ficient. Its provisions rely on heavy government regulation instead of price instruments
recognized as more efficient at curbing systemic risk. Applying the same lens here as for
the environmental regulation example, the inefficiencies can be viewed as a price paid
by liberals to insure at least some regulation was implemented and, from the perspective
of the more laissez faire members of Congress at the time, an acceptable intervention in
response to the fallout from the crisis but one that can be more easily unpacked in eco-
nomically calmer times. Consistent with this view, on June 9 2017, The Financial Choice
Act, legislation that would “undo significant parts” of Dodd–Frank, passed the House
233–186.
Related literature. We are not the first researchers to offer an explanation for why
governments implement inefficient policies. However, the logic that underlies our ar-
gument is, to the best of our knowledge, novel: inefficient interventions are more likely
to be repealed should circumstances change, making them more likely to be accepted
in the first place by all veto players. On the abstract level, there are three main features
that distinguish our paper from the literature. First, the mechanism does not depend on
the specificities of the economic environment, or on how the policy interacts with the
private sector, or the electorate. Instead, inefficiency arises solely from the conflict of in-
terests between legislators and the need to adapt the policy to a changing environment.
Second, the inefficient policy in our model is inefficient in a static sense: there exists a
policy that gives a strictly greater flow-payoff to all relevant decision makers in all states
of nature. Third, the inefficient policy is not only the result of status quo inertia whereby
4See Alesina et al. (2017) for a recent literature review. The findings of that literature are still subject
to intense debate, but we would like to point out that the logic of our model applies equally to the oppo-
site case in which a tax increase is more efficient than a spending cut, the only difference being that the
interventionist player is then the liberal veto player.
5An alternative explanation for why tax hikes might be chosen even when they are less efficient than
spending cuts is that the latter hurt powerful constituencies such as retirees or unions. However, that ex-
planation is harder to reconcile with empirical findings that governments whose austerity programs focus
on spending cuts are no less likely to be reelected than those that focus on tax increase (Alesina et al. 1998).
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a previously optimal policy becomes obsolete; instead, it is actively implemented by the
policy makers.
The paper closest to ours is Dziuda and Loeper (2016), who analyze a similar model
except that they restrict the policy set to policies that are statically Pareto undominated
for some states. They show that inefficient inertia occurs because each pivotal player
fears that policy changes approved by her will be hard to repeal when she wishes to do
so. As a result, the status quo can persist even when Pareto dominated. Hence, any inef-
ficiency takes the form of status quo inertia and any policy change is a Pareto improve-
ment. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008), Zapál (2011), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012),
Bowen et al. (2017), and Dziuda and Loeper (2018) consider related models of dynamic
legislative bargaining that also lead to policy inertia. Relative to these papers, our con-
tribution is to show that adding a Pareto inefficient alternative to the policy space can
mitigate policy inertia. In particular, legislators may adopt a Pareto-dominated policy
change.6
Since our model requires policy makers to respond to shocks, it is related to the liter-
ature on policy reforms. Alesina and Drazen (1991) show that legislators can engage in a
war of attrition over who should bear the costs of reform. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)
and Ali et al. (2017) show that uncertainty over the distributional impact of reforms may
stifle them. Spolaore (2004) compares the likelihood of policy adjustment across three
stylized institutions. In Strulovici (2010), an endogenous status quo bias arises if a ma-
jority learns that the new policy is beneficial for them. Anticipating this situation, policy
makers may not want to try out new policies in the first place. Unlike in our model, these
papers consider the policy response to a single shock after which legislators’ policy pref-
erences are fixed over time and restrict attention to efficient policy adjustments. Hence,
inefficiency only takes the form of delays or failure to intervene. In contrast, legislators
act without delay in our model, but the solution they adopt is inefficient.
There is also a large political science literature that explores inefficient policy mak-
ing due to structural characteristics of legislative decisionmaking (e.g., the filibuster or
committee structure). Important examples here include Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and
Volden (2006), who explore models of gridlock, Ortner (2017), who shows that gridlock is
likely near the next election, and Weingast et al. (1981) and Cox and McCubbins (2000),
who analyze legislative structure and inefficient public good provision more generally.
6In a distributive environment, Bowen et al. (2014) and Anesi and Seidmann (2015) show that endoge-
nous status quo can lead to Pareto inefficient policies, because they allow the proposer or the supporting
coalition to extract greater transfers in the future. In these papers, preferences do not evolve over time, as
in most of the literature on dynamic policy making with an endogenous status quo. Policy dynamics occur
because the proposer changes (e.g., Baron 1996, Bernheim et al. 2006, Kalandrakis 2004, Anesi and Duggan
2018, Buisseret and Bernhardt 2017) or because the same proposer forms different coalitions over time (e.g.,
Diermeier and Fong 2011). In contrast, in our model, each proposer always seeks the support of the same
policy maker and the qualitative nature of policy inefficiencies is, by and large, independent of the alloca-
tion of bargaining power. Acharya and Ortner (2013) obtain Pareto inefficient solution in a divide-a-dollar
game because, as in our paper and for similar reasons, players cannot commit to trade-off their payoffs in-
tertemporally. A different strand of literature assumes that the implemented policy influences future states
(see Hassler et al. 2003, for example). Baldursson and von der Fehr (2007) is closer to our story, as they argue
that a relatively “brown” party may prefer quotas rather than taxes, because the relatively inefficient quotas
are essentially property rights that are difficult to tighten or remove later.
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To our knowledge, however, there is as yet no analysis that focuses directly on the delib-
erate strategic choice of inefficient policy change when policy change occurs.
Inefficient policy choices by a unitary actor, whether a single legislator or a fully co-
ordinated party or group, can also be explained by aspects of the political economic
environment other than legislative design. In Coate and Morris (1995), Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), and, to some extent, Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014), inefficient policy
choices arise from an incumbent legislator’s efforts to retain office.7 Whereas the Coate
and Morris (1995) and Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014) accounts rest on asymmetric infor-
mation, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) generate policy inefficiency from a model in
which distortionary transfer payments are designed to counter declining political sup-
port and influence. Tullock (1993), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Becker and Mulligan
(2003), and Drazen and Limao (2008) argue that any resource transfer increases wasteful
lobbying (rent-seeking) activity. By committing itself to inefficient transfers, the govern-
ment can reduce the level of wasteful lobbying. More generally, there is an extensive
literature on policy distortions induced through special interest groups’ lobbying and
campaign contribution activities (see Wright 1996 and Grossman and Helpman 2001 for
overviews of the literature).
The problem at the root of our paper is related to the dynamic lack of commitment
studied extensively in the literature. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) or Fearon
(1998), for example, the inability of the players to commit leads to inefficient conflict
(see Powell 2004 for an interesting overview). In our paper, the inability of the players to
commit to repeal of certain policies leads to Pareto inefficient gridlock. Giving players
access to Pareto inefficient alternatives that they frequently may want to repeal due to
their inefficiency can mitigate this commitment problem.
Aidt (2003) claims that inefficient command-and-control instruments are more bu-
reaucracy intensive and, to the extent that bureaucrats influence policy design and de-
rive value from implementing policy, such interventions are favored by bureaucrats.
Alesina and Passarelli (2014) and Masciandaro and Passarelli (2013) offer explanations
of socially suboptimal policies that hinge on the median voter failing to internalize the
costs and benefits to others when policies have different distributional consequences.
However, both available policy choices are Pareto optimal in these papers. In contrast to
these approaches, inefficiency in our model does not depend on groups, informational
asymmetries, or reelection concerns.
2. A simple example
In this section we present a stylized example to illustrate the key mechanism and to pre-
view some of our results. The mechanism requires two pivotal players, or legislators, L
and R, both of whom must approve any policy change. Specifically, at the start of any
legislative period, nature randomly chooses one legislator to propose a change in, or
maintain, the status quo policy. The other legislator has a veto right over any proposed
change in the status quo. Legislators start with no intervention, denoted by n, and can
7See also Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Buisseret and Bernhardt (2018) for how electoral incentives can
lead to policy distortions.
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intervene by introducing either an efficient instrument p or an inefficient instrument q.
The flow-payoff from policy n is normalized at 0. Intervention gives everyone a benefit
θ, and the costs associated with p and q are wi and wi + ei, respectively, for i ∈ {LR}.
We assume that ei > 0 for each i, so that ei is the additional benefit of the efficient in-
strument.
We can immediately make a simple observation.
Proposition 0. Suppose there is only one period. Then the inefficient policy q is never
implemented in equilibrium.
Suppose now that there are two periods and let δ > 0 be the common discount factor.
The status quo in the first period is n and the first-period policy becomes the status quo
in the second period. Assume further that there are only two states, θ and θ¯ > θ, with θ¯
occurring with probability π, and suppose that the costs associated with p and q satisfy
wL < θ <min{wL + eLwR} ≤max{wL + eLwR + eR}< θ¯ (1)
The last inequality in (1) means that in state θ¯, both players prefer any type of interven-
tion to n. The first two inequalities in (1), however, imply that in state θ, the less interven-
tionist player R prefers no intervention, while the more interventionist player L prefers
to intervene, but only if the intervention is with the efficient instrument. In terms of our
environmental application, θ¯ can be interpreted as the usual state of the economy in
which both parties agree that environmental interventions are desirable, while θ can be
interpreted as an economic downturn that makes the R party (but not the L party) want
to repeal any regulation that can compromise economic growth. In the case of fiscal
consolidation, θ may be interpreted as a business-as-usual state in which parties differ
ideologically on whether public spending should be cut, while θ¯ can be interpreted as a
fiscal crisis state in which both parties are willing either to cut spending or to increase
taxes to bring public debt under control.
Consider the last period in this game. In state θ¯, both players strictly prefer p to any
other policy. So, independently of which player has proposal rights, p is implemented
in that state. What is implemented in the low state θ, however, depends on the status
quo. If n is the status quo, R does not approve (propose or accept, depending on the
allocation of proposal rights) any change in policy. Similarly, ifp is the status quo, L does
not approve of any change in policy. Finally, if q is the status quo, then the two players
agree that either n or p is better than the status quo, but they disagree on which is best.
In this situation, p is implemented if L has the proposal power and n is implemented
otherwise. This reasoning implies that, in the second period, p is not repealable, but q
can be repealable when the realized state in that period is θ.
Consider now the first period and suppose the state is θ¯ with status quo n. Both play-
ers’ first-period flow-payoffs are maximized by policy p. But since p is not repealable, R
may be reluctant to approve such a change in policy. In particular, R does not approve p
in the first period if the benefit of p relative to n in state θ¯ is outweighed by the expected
cost of being stuck with p in state θ; that is, if
θ−wR < δ(1−π)(wR − θ)
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Thus, players fail to intervene efficiently in the first period if the disagreement state
θ is relatively likely (i.e., 1 − π is high), if players are patient, and if R’s preference for
intervention in state θ is relatively weak compared to R’s preference for no intervention
in state θ. Alternatively, because q is more easily repealed than p, R may be willing to
intervene with q. Denoting by bL ∈ [01] the probability that L has the authority to make
a take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal in the second period, R approves an intervention q
in the first period if
θ¯−wR − eR ≥ δ(1−π)bL(wR − θ)
In addition, since L receives a higher flow-payoff from q than n in state θ¯, and the like-
lihood that a change from status quo q to p in the second period exceeds that from n to
p, L also prefers and approves q over n in the first period. Finally, because players share
the same ordinal policy preferences over n and q in both states, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose there are two periods and
δ(1−π)bL(wR − θ)+ eR ≤ θ−wR < δ(1−π)(wR − θ)
Then, in the first period of any subgame perfect equilibrium, the following statements
hold:
(i) Intervention occurs in θ¯ when the policy menu is {npq}, but not when the menu
is {np}.
(ii) Both players strictly prefer menu {npq} to menu {np}.
The fact that efficient policies are hard to repeal can make them politically impossi-
ble to agree upon in a dynamic setting. At the same time, as part (i) of the proposition
states, it is precisely because of its inefficiency that both legislators may approve a first-
period intervention with q in state θ. Additionally, as part (ii) of the proposition asserts,
adding this statically Pareto-dominated choice to the policy menu may not only result
in its use, but it also strictly improves equilibrium payoffs for both players.
To our knowledge, the preceding claims are new to the literature. They are, however,
derived in a stylized example that raises a number of questions. For instance, the cost
of instrument q is limited since q will always be replaced by either n or p in the last pe-
riod. But what is the desirability of q in a dynamic model when there is no last period?
Furthermore, the binary state space in the example implies that instrument p will never
be repealed once implemented. But why should the players prefer q to p in a more gen-
eral setting where both interventions may eventually be repealed? To explore these and
several other issues further, the following section generalizes the model to an infinite
number of periods and to more general distributions of states.
3. Model
Policies, payoffs, and players. Two infinitely lived players, L and R, must decide in each
period t ∈N which of three policies {npq} to implement. Their preferences over these
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policies in a given period t depend on the realization of the state of nature θ(t) ∈R, and
are specified as in the preceding example. That is, normalizing both players’ flow-payoff
from policy n in any state θ to zero, Ui(θn) = 0, i ∈ {LR}, player i’s flow-payoffs from
policies p and q relative to policy n in θ are, respectively,
Ui(θp)= θ−wi
Ui(θq)= θ− (wi + ei)
(2)
Thus, ei is the period flow-payoff gain for player i from implementing p instead of q. For
simplicity, we assume that this gain is independent of θ. More importantly, we assume
that ei > 0 for both players. That is, intervention p Pareto dominates intervention q
in all states of nature. Although the state of nature does not affect which intervention
is best, it affects whether an intervention is needed in the first place: given the zero
flow-payoff from no intervention, n, player i gets a greater flow-payoff from policy p
than from policy n when θ ≥ wi, and a greater flow-payoff from q than from n when
θ≥wi+ei. Importantly, unless we specify otherwise, we assume that wL =wR, that is, in
some states of nature, players disagree whether the efficient intervention p is preferred
to no intervention n. By convention, L denotes the more interventionist player, so wL <
wR.8 At times, we refer to wR −wL as polarization over efficient intervention.
Timing of the game. Every period t ∈ N starts with some status quo s(t) ∈ {npq},
with s(0)= n. At the beginning of period t, both players observe the state θ(t) ∈R. After
θ(t) is observed, L and R must collectively choose a policy from the set {npq}. We as-
sume that one player makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other regarding which pol-
icy to implement. The recognition probability for player i is denoted by bi(θ s), which
may depend on the current state θ and status quo s. We assume that bi is bounded be-
low by some b > 0. The recognized proposer offers a policy y(t) ∈ {npq}. If the other
player, the veto player, accepts this proposal, then y(t) is implemented; otherwise, the
status quo s(t) stays in place. The policy implemented in t, whether the proposal y(t) or
the status quo s(t), generates the flow-payoff for that period, as specified in (2), and be-
comes the status quo in the next period, t + 1. Each player maximizes her expected dis-
counted payoff over the infinite horizon. The common discount factor is δ ∈ (01). For
simplicity, we initially assume that {θ(t) : t ≥ 0} is distributed identically and indepen-
dently over time according to some continuous cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.)
F with full support. This assumption is relaxed in Section 5 to permit serial correlation.
Equilibrium concept. We denote the above game by  and restrict attention to
Markov-perfect equilibria, referred to as “equilibria” in what follows. A Markov-perfect
equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players use Markov strategies. In
this game, a strategy is Markov if it depends only on the current state, the current status
quo, the identity of the proposer, and the current proposal at the action node of the veto
player. Let σi denote i’s Markov strategy. A (pure) Markov strategy for player i ∈ {LR}
8The terms “instrument” and “intervention” are used exclusively in reference to alternatives p and q.
The term “policy” may refer to any of the available alternatives, including n. This looseness should cause
no confusion. Also, we say that a policy p or q is “repealed” when it is the status quo and players agree to
replace it by n.
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consists of two contingent actions: a function that maps the current state and status quo
into a policy proposal, conditional on i being the proposer, and a function that maps the
current state, status quo, and proposal into a choice over accepting or rejecting the pro-
posal, conditional on i being the veto player.9 Let σ = (σLσR). We briefly discuss the
robustness of our restriction to Markov strategies at the end of Section 4.3. We allow for
mixed strategies.
Since our interest regards the use of the inefficient instrument q, throughout the
paper we focus on the equilibria in which q is implemented. To this end, the following
definition is useful.
Definition 1. Let σ be an equilibrium of . Then σ is an instrument inefficient equi-
librium (IE) if q is implemented with positive probability on the equilibrium path; σ is
an instrument efficient equilibrium (EE) otherwise.
Remarks on the assumptions. Some of the assumptions are made for simplicity and
relaxing them may not change the results. In particular, binary policy levels are not nec-
essary for the results. To see this, suppose that players can choose any level of p or q and
consider a two-period example again. The inefficient instrument q will not be used in
the last period and the set of states under which p is repealed will be independent of its
level. The inefficient q, however, will still be easier to repeal at any level, and the logic of
our paper applies.
Three assumptions are crucial. First, the mechanics of the model rests on multi-
ple veto players. With a unicameral legislature taking decisions under simple majority
rule, the policy maker i with the median wi would be the unique pivotal decision maker.
However, multiple veto players are natural in politics. Bicameralism, supermajority re-
quirements, presidential veto power, or powerful interests groups imply the existence
of a set of veto players, or pivots, whose approval is necessary and sufficient to enact
a policy change. In the case of a unicameral legislature taking decisions under a qual-
ified majority m ∈ ( 12 1], player L is such that exactly a fraction m of the wis are larger
than wL and, for player R, exactly m of the wis are smaller than wR. Thus, the degree of
polarization wR −wL increases in the majority requirement m.
Second, we assume away explicit side payments and state-contingent contracts. If
the players could make unlimited side payments or sign state-contingent contracts,
then only efficient policies would be implemented in equilibrium.10 In particular, policy
p would be implemented when θ > (wL + wR)/2, and policy n would be implemented
otherwise. Explicit side payments and state contingent contracts, however, are rare and
often unavailable in politics. An important reason for this is that there is no independent
third party that can verify a particular realization of the state and enforce any ex ante
9Note that Markov strategies are not allowed to depend on calendar time, as the date is payoff irrelevant
with an infinite horizon. Mixed strategies are admissible. More formally, writing 	S for the set of probability
distributions over a set S, i’s proposal strategy takes R× {nqp} into 	{nqp}, and i’s veto strategy takes
R× {nqp}2 into 	{accept reject}. Markov strategies are standard in the literature on dynamic bargaining
with endogenous status quo.
10For results on the efficiency of state-contingent policies for the allocation of public goods, see Bowen
et al. (2017).
1494 Austen-Smith, Dziuda, Harstad, and Loeper Theoretical Economics 14 (2019)
agreement. In the case of fiscal consolidation, for example, θ may capture the impact
of a shock to money markets on the long term sustainability of public debt and whether
fiscal consolidation can bring this debt under control. Similarly, in the environmental
application, θ may capture changes in the social cost of the polluting activity and the
social opportunity cost of regulating the polluting industry, and in the infant industry
case, θ might be the impact of a technical innovation that affects where an infant indus-
try stands on its learning curve. In all of these applications, it is unlikely that θ could be
measured in a transparent way by a nonpartisan entity. Imperfect verifiable proxies for θ
may exist (e.g., interest rate on government bonds as a proxy for the impact of a shock to
money markets), but whether and under what conditions contracts contingent on such
proxies improve the efficiency of the policy making is left for future research.
Third, we assume that any implemented policy stays in place until it is actively
changed. This is consistent with legislative practice. Most laws and policies enacted
by the U.S. Congress, for example, are permanent: they remain in effect until a new leg-
islative action is taken. This is the case for mandatory spending policies, which include
all entitlements, currently about 60% of total federal spending (Austin and Levit 2010),
constitutional amendments, most statutes in the U.S. code, the Senate’s rules of pro-
ceedings, and international treaties. Likewise, changes to the tax code are permanent
unless legislators decide to attach a sunset provision, that is, a clause that specifies a
period after which the relevant legislative act automatically expires. Historically, attach-
ing sunset clauses to legislation has been the exception rather than the norm, and tends
to occur mainly for procedural reasons.11 Nevertheless, in theory, a sunset clause can
address the concern of the less interventionist player that an efficient intervention will
stay in place too long. Thus, the availability of sunset clauses seems, at least prima fa-
cie, to remove the strategic value of inefficient instruments highlighted in this paper. In
the working paper version, however, we present an example that shows that even when
sunsets are available at no cost, the inefficient instrument might still be implemented.
A careful analysis of sunsets is beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Analysis
The following lemma states that an equilibrium exists and that all equilibria have
a relatively simple structure: in any equilibrium of , players behave as if they are
playing a static version of the game  (a single period) with flow-payoff parameters
(wσLw
σ
Re
σ
Le
σ
R) rather than (wLwReLeR).
11See, e.g., Posner and Vermeule (2002, pp. 1672, 1694, and 1701) on the permanent nature of statutes,
the Senate’s internal rules, or international treaties. As for tax legislation, prior to the Bush administration,
the use of sunsets for changes in the tax code applied mainly to relatively small provisions known as tax ex-
tenders and were of significantly smaller scale Gale and Orszag (2003), Mooney (2004). Many sunsetted leg-
islations are frequently extended beyond the initial duration, often because of the activities of vested inter-
ests or the legislative costs of implementing the change. Since the repeal of inefficient instruments requires
legislative work only when the state of nature justifies it, and not at predetermined state-independent dates,
using inefficient instruments results in lower legislative cost than sunset provisions.
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Lemma 1. There exist equilibria in . Moreover, for any equilibrium σ , there exists a
unique tuple (wσLw
σ
Re
σ
Le
σ
R) ∈ R4 such that the behavior prescribed by σ is the same
as the behavior prescribed by an equilibrium of the game in which players play a single
period of with payoffs V σi (θn)= 0 and
V σi (θp)= θ−wσi
V σi (θq)= θ−
(
wσi + eσi
)

All proofs are provided in the Appendix.12 We call (wσLw
σ
Re
σ
Le
σ
R) the continuation
payoff parameters induced by σ and note that they reflect players’ strategic preferences
in the equilibrium, that is, their policy preferences given continuation play σ , as dis-
tinct from their exogenous “ideological” preference parameters (wLwReLeR). Note
that V σi (θp) − V σi (θq) = eσi , so eσi represents the continuation payoff difference for
player i from some period t onward from implementing p instead of q in that period,
given continuation play σ . Hence, eσi reflects i’s preferences over the efficient and the
inefficient intervention in the dynamic game.
To understand the intuition for Lemma 1, consider the continuation payoff gain for
player i from implementing p instead of n in some t. Player i gets a flow-payoff gain
of θ(t) − wi in period t, plus the expected continuation payoff gain from having status
quo p instead of n in t + 1. Since {θ(t) : t ∈N} is independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), this expected continuation payoff gain does not depend on θ(t), but only on the
anticipated play σ and, hence, is simply a constant Cσ . The continuation payoff gain
from implementing p instead of n in t is, therefore, θ(t) − wi + Cσ , so wσi is given by
wi −Cσ .13
The main goal of this paper is to understand the strategic underpinnings of IE and
why they can be beneficial. Therefore, for the sake of exposition, we focus only on IE.
We first derive their properties (Section 4.1) and then the conditions under which they
exist (Section 4.2).
Before we proceed, however, let us say a few words about the EE. By definition, in
any EE, the inefficient instrument is not used; hence, EE are essentially equivalent to the
equilibria of the two-alternative game of Dziuda and Loeper (2016). They show that in
such equilibria, the more pro-intervention player distorts her votes in favor of p, and the
less pro-intervention player distorts her votes in favor of n, that is, wσL < wL <wR <w
σ
R.
As a result, even EE are inefficient in that there is excessive status quo inertia: a policy
that was once adequate for the environment becomes obsolete, but players do not agree
12Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012) provide a very general existence result for dynamic bargaining games
with an endogenous status quo. But to apply their result directly here requires violating our assumption
that U(θp)−U(θq) is constant in θ. Although introducing some noise to the payoffs, to ensure the differ-
ence is not locally constant, and letting that noise tend to zero is possible, the result would be a correlated
equilibrium that obscures the particular trade-offs of interest here.
13If the process {θ(t) : t ∈ N} is serially correlated, Cσ becomes a function of θ(t), whose variations de-
pend both on the nature of the serial correlation, and on the set of types for which status quo n and p lead
to different outcomes on the path of σ . In particular, the continuation payoff gain from implementing p
instead of n, i.e., θ(t)−wi +Cσ(θ(t)), might become non-monotone in θ(t), possibly leading to equilibria
that are not in threshold strategies.
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to change it. This kind of inefficiency, however, does not explain the puzzle outlined in
the Introduction, namely, why interventions that are inefficient in any state of the world
are implemented. So IE differ from EE not in whether the equilibrium path is inefficient,
but in the nature of inefficiency.
4.1 Properties of IE
The following proposition summarizes the main qualitative properties of any IE.
Proposition 2. Let σ be an IE. Then the corresponding continuation payoff parameters
(wσLw
σ
Re
σ
Le
σ
R) satisfy the following inequalities for some i j ∈ {LR}, i = j.
(i) The set of states at which j prefers to intervene with p is a proper subset of those at
which i prefers to intervene with p:
wσi < w
σ
j 
(ii) Player i prefers to intervene with p rather than q, and j weakly prefers to intervene
with q rather than p:
eσi > 0 and e
σ
j ≤ 0
(iii) The set of states at which both i and j prefer to repeal p is a proper subset of those
at which they both prefer to repeal q:
min
k∈{LR}
(
wσk
)
< min
k∈{LR}
(
wσk + eσk
)

Part (i) of Proposition 2 states that in any IE, one player i ∈ {LR} is strictly more
interventionist than the other player j. Part (ii) states that, in equilibrium, players dis-
agree on the appropriate intervention. In all states, player i prefers using the efficient
instrument p to the inefficient instrument q, whereas player j weakly prefers interven-
ing with q rather than p. Finally, part (iii) implies that, consistent with the intuition
provided in the Introduction, the inefficient instrument q is easier to repeal than the ef-
ficient instrument p. To see this, assume p is the status quo. Then eσi > 0 implies player
i always vetoes proposal q and, by definition of wσk , at least one player vetoes the pro-
posal n for all states above mink∈{LR}(wσk ). Hence, in all such states, the status quo p
remains in place. Conversely, for all states below mink∈{LR}(wσk ), both players prefer n
to any instrument, so p is repealed. Both players, however, prefer n to q in all states be-
low mink∈{LR}(wσk + eσk). So (iii) implies that q is repealed on a larger set of states than
is p.
To understand the policy dynamics implied by Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, let us
consider first the equilibria in which eσj < 0, that is, equilibria in which j strictly prefers
to intervene with the inefficient instrument. In that case, there are only two possible
equilibrium paths, illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, depending on whether maxk{wσk +
eσk }<wσj (Figure 1) or wσj <maxk{wσk + eσk } (Figure 2). For concreteness, in Figures 1 and
2 we illustrate these two possibilities for the equilibria in which i=L and j =R.14 States
14Since wL < wR, it is natural to conjecture that necessarily i = L, but equilibria with i = R may arise as
well. See the discussion at the end of this section.
Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments 1497
Figure 1. An example of IE with both players choosing q for some states.
Figure 2. An example of IE with both players choosing p for some states.
are measured along the horizontal axis and policies are indicated by the three shaded
bars above this axis. An arrow identifies an equilibrium policy change, conditional on
the status quo, for any realized state within the same interval of states as that in which
the arrow is drawn. For intervals of states where there is no arrow drawn, there is no pol-
icy change on the equilibrium path. The status quo at the start of any period in which
there is a policy change is indicated by the origin of the relevant arrow; the arrowhead
indicates the policy instrument chosen to replace the status quo.
In Figure 1, for example, suppose that the status quo going into the current period
is n and the realized state is θ ∈ (maxk{wσk + eσk }wσR). Player L prefers intervening with
p to intervening with q, but state θ is high enough so that she prefers intervening with
either instrument to staying with n. Player R prefers intervening with q, as the expected
benefit from q being easier to repeal outweighs the inefficiency cost, but the difficulty
of repealing p makes her prefer no intervention n to p. Hence, q is the only alternative
that dominates n for both players in that state. As a result, q is implemented indepen-
dently of who is the proposer, as indicated by the upward-pointing arrow. Alternatively,
if θ > wσR, the intervention is so desirable that both players prefer intervening with ei-
ther policy instrument. Since they differ with respect to their ordering of p and q, the
implemented policy depends on who has proposal power. This is indicated by labeling
the upward-pointing arrows for such states by the proposer’s identity. When the status
quo is either p or q, the downward-pointing arrows indicate those states in which the
relevant instrument is repealed. As stated in Proposition 2, q is repealed for a larger set
of states.
Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 only in that the less interventionist player, R, is willing
to accept p in some states for which L is unwilling to accept the inefficient alternative
q. As a result, for θ ∈ (wσR {wσL + eσL}), R is forced to propose p and, therefore, p is imple-
mented independently of who has proposal power.
In an equilibrium in which eσj = 0, when it exists, player j is indifferent between
intervening with p and q, so the equilibrium may involve some mixing and the paths
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 must be amended. Consider again the case in which
j = R, as the other case is analogous. In Figures 1 and 2, whenever n is replaced by q
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(for θ > maxk{wσk + eσk }), it is because either R is the proposer and chooses the inter-
vention that is better for her or L is the proposer and proposes q because R would not
accept p. In an equilibrium with eσR = 0, however, R is indifferent between q and p, so in
these states, n may be replaced by p with positive probability instead. Similarly, when-
ever q remains in place in Figures 1 and 2 (for θ >mink{wσk +eσk }), R may agree to replace
it with p (given she is indifferent as eσR = 0); hence, additional arrows from q to p should
be drawn.
Since wL < wR, it is natural to conjecture that in any equilibrium, wσL < w
σ
R, that
is, i = L and j = R in Proposition 2, as we assumed in Figures 1 and 2. In addition,
one can indeed show that for any w, e, δ, and F , there always exists an equilibrium
such that wσL < w
σ
R, though this equilibrium need not be IE. Moreover, when eL ≥ eR,
all equilibria have this property.15 However, when eL < eR, there always exists an F for
which the game admits an IE with wσL > w
σ
R. In such equilibria, w
σ
L + eσL < wσR + eσR,
so R behaves in a more (less) interventionist way than L with the efficient (inefficient)
instrument. The intuition for such equilibria is as follows. If eR is sufficiently large, then
R strongly prefers intervention p to q. But when the status quo is n and θ is sufficiently
large, R approves a proposal q by L if such a proposal is made. To hedge against such a
possibility, R’s best response involves a bias against n when p is the status quo; that is,
R blocks repealing p even for some states for which her flow-payoff from n is higher. If
this bias is large enough, we may have wσR < w
σ
L, which means that p stays in place for
a larger set of states than L would like. Anticipating R’s bias and the resulting inertia
under status quo p, L proposes to intervene with q rather than with p when the status
quo is n, rationalizing R’s best response bias.16
4.2 Use of inefficient instruments in equilibrium
In this section, we discuss how the types of equilibria and the equilibrium parameters
(wσeσ) vary with the primitives of the model. To understand the discussion below,
recall that from Proposition 2, an IE requires eσj ≤ 0 for some player j, where eσj is j’s
continuation payoff difference from a given period t onward from implementing p in-
stead of q in t, given continuation play σ . Policy p yields a greater flow-payoff than q in
t, but status quo p and q may also induce different continuation policy paths in t+ 1. As
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, in t + 1, either status quo p and q are both repealed (for θ
small enough), in which case they lead to the same continuation path, or they both stay
in place (for θ large enough), in which case players keep on getting a greater flow-payoff
from p than from q, or status quo p stays in place whereas q is repealed (for interme-
diate values of θ), in which case the player j who wants to repeal p in such states gets a
15The proof that eL ≥ eR implies that in any equilibrium σ , wσL < wσR follows directly from (24) in
Lemma 4 in the Appendix. The proof that there always exists an equilibrium such that wσL < w
σ
R can be
found in Proposition 5 in the working paper version of this paper available on the authors’ websites.
16In the Appendix (see the example in Appendix A.4), we consider an environment in which wL =wR and
eL < eR, and we construct an IE σ such thatwσR <w
σ
L+eσL < wσR+eσR <wσR. By continuity, for some wL <wR,
there exists a nearby IE whose continuation payoff parameters satisfy the same inequality, which formally
proves that there exists an IE in which the more interventionist player behaves as the least interventionist
in equilibrium.
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greater continuation payoff from status quo q. Thus, for eσj to be negative, the third case
must be sufficiently likely and beneficial to j, relative to the inefficiency of q.
We first discuss how the existence of IE depends on the degree of players’ polar-
ization over when to enact and repeal p, as captured by (wLwR). Fix F and δ, and,
for simplicity, consider the case eL = eR = e for some fixed e > 0, that is, q is equally
inefficient for L and R. In that case, as discussed in Section 4.1, in any equilibrium,
wσL < w
σ
R, so from Proposition 2, an IE requires e
σ
R ≤ 0. In the extreme case of no polar-
ization wL =wR, players do not expect any disagreement, and the inefficient instrument
q has no strategic value. As a result, the only equilibrium is an EE in which players be-
have as if they were playing a one-shot game, i.e., wσL = wσR = wL = wR and eσL = eσR = e
(see part (iii) of Proposition 3).17 As players become more polarized (i.e., as wR in-
creases and wL decreases), players’ period preferences disagree over whether to repeal
p when θ ∈ [wLwR]. If wR −wL is sufficiently small, these disagreement states are un-
likely. Therefore, the greater repealability of q does not compensate for its inefficiency,
so eσR > 0 and all equilibria remain EE. However, each player is now biased in favor of
the policy that gives her a greater payoff in the disagreement states, which implies that
wσL < wL < wR < w
σ
R. This means that the set of the states in which players disagree
on the policy change is larger than in a one-shot game. As polarization increases fur-
ther, players’ equilibrium preferences over when to enact and repeal p are more likely
to disagree (i.e., wσL decreases and w
σ
R increases further), so the greater repealability of
q becomes more attractive to R. As a result, eσR may become negative and an IE may
arise.18
As the conflict of interests becomes severe, i.e., as (wLwR)→ (−∞+∞), the play-
ers are rarely aligned with respect to whether any intervention is warranted. Thus, both
p and q are unlikely to be repealed, and the players perceive any decision as virtually
permanent. As a result, q loses its strategic value and all equilibria become EE again (see
part (iii) of Proposition 3).
Now fix F , δ, and players’ polarization over the efficient intervention (wLwR), and
consider the role of (eL eR). Given eL, as eR increases, q becomes more inefficient for
player R. So if eR is sufficiently large, the guarantee of being able to repeal q more eas-
ily tomorrow does not offset its inefficiency today and all equilibria are EE. Conversely,
when eR is sufficiently small, the strategic value of q always outweighs its inefficiency
and all equilibria are IE (see part (i) of Proposition 3).
17Proposition 3 part (iii) does not assume eL = eR. In this more general case, it is still true that an EE
always exists as (wLwR) → (ww). However, an IE may also exist (see the example in Appendix A.4 for a
formal proof of that claim). Basically, when eL = eR, in some states, players’ period preferences disagree
when comparing n and q, and this sincere disagreement between n and q can generate a strategic disagree-
ment between n and p as well, even though wL =wR. To understand how such equilibria can be sustained,
note that the player with the greater ek, say L for concreteness, may be concerned that under status quo
n, for θ large enough, R will propose q and L will have no choice but to accept it. To avoid this situation,
L becomes biased against n and prefers to leave p in place for a greater set of sets than R would like. To
avoid this inertia of status quo p, R prefers to intervene with q rather than with p, rationalizing L’s initial
concern.
18EE may disappear or may coexist, depending on the parameters. See the discussion under Proposi-
tion 5 or the example in Appendix A.4 for other examples in which IE and EE may coexist.
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Similarly, increasing eL, given eR, makes q more inefficient for player L. In this case,
however, there are two countervailing effects. On one hand, L approves the repeal of
q in more states, which increases the strategic value of q for R. On the other hand, L
approves proposal q in fewer states. Regardless of the value of eL, however, for θ large
enough, L prefers implementing q to n, and R can be sure q is accepted and imple-
mented on the equilibrium path. Intuitively then R will suggest q as long as she does
not find it too inefficient. Hence, if for some parameters all equilibria are IE, then all
equilibria remain IE as q becomes more inefficient for player L (see part (ii) of Proposi-
tion 3). This discussion implies that the inefficient policy instrument will be used when
it is sufficiently costly for player L and not too (in relative terms) costly for player R.
The following proposition formalizes the main claims above.
Proposition 3. Fix δ ∈ (01), the recognition probability functions bL and bR, and the
c.d.f. F . Then the following statements hold:
(i) For anywL,wR, and eL, there exists e¯R ∈ (0+∞) such that all equilibria are IE for
all eR < e¯R, and for all eR > e¯R, there exists EE.
(ii) For any wL, wR, and eR, if all equilibria are IE for some eL, they are all IE for
e′L > eL.
(iii) For any (eL eR) and any average ideology (wL+wR)/2, as (wR−wL)→ +∞, then
all equilibria are EE, and as (wR −wL)→ 0, there exists an EE.
The last claim of Proposition 3 sheds light on how the use of inefficient instruments
may relate to the nature of the political system. The existence of checks and balances
in a multi-member political system reflects a demand for some degree of “consensus”
for policy change. Examples include supermajority voting rules, as mentioned earlier,
or agreement between the median voter in a legislature subject to simple majority rule
and the president. This sort of consensus in our model is approximated by the level of
polarization, (wR − wL): the larger is this distance, the greater is the implicit level of
consensus required for policy change (see Dziuda and Loeper 2018 and Krehbiel 1998).
Consequently, to the extent that more checks and balances are associated with demands
for more consensus, Proposition 3 implies that inefficient instruments are likely to be
used in political systems with moderate polarization and moderate degrees of checks
and balances.
We emphasize, however, that the above statements hold for fixed δ and F . So a
particular degree of polarization over efficient intervention may lead to EE for some
patience and distribution of states of nature, but may lead to IE for other values of
these primitives. The following proposition shows that for any payoff parameters
(wLwReLeR), all equilibria are IE for some patience and distribution of the state.
In particular, no matter how inefficient the policy instrument q is, all equilibria may be
IE.
Proposition 4. Let F be a c.d.f. with mean 0 and variance 1, and let (Fmd)m∈Rd>0
denote the corresponding location–scale family of c.d.f., where, for all m ∈ R and d > 0,
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Fmd(θ) ≡ F(θ−md ). Then for any (wLwReLeR), there exists d¯ > 0, δ < δ¯, and m < m¯
such that for all δ ∈ [δ δ¯],m ∈ [mm¯], and d ∈ (0 d¯], all equilibria of  are IE for the c.d.f.
Fmd .
The proposition is predicated on the observation that two things must be true for
all equilibria to be IE. Players must frequently disagree over whether n or p is a better
policy, but they must frequently agree over whether n or q is a better policy. To guaran-
tee the former, in the proof, we select [mm¯] within the set of states (wLwR) in which
L wants to maintain p whereas R wants to repeal it, and we select d¯ small enough so
that most of the probability mass is concentrated around the mean m ∈ [mm¯] of Fmd .
To guarantee the latter, we select m¯ to the left of wL + eL and wR + eR, so that in the
most frequent states close to m, both players prefer no intervention n to the inefficient
intervention q. We then choose the minimum level of patience δ such that the greater
repealability of q outweighs its inefficiency for R and R prefers to intervene with q rather
than with p. However, if players are too patient, an EE may also exist. The reason is that
in states close to m, even though L gets a greater flow-payoff from n than from q, under
status quo q, L may credibly commit to accept and propose only p, in which case R has
no choice but to accept and propose only p because R prefers a permanent p to a per-
manent q. Given these expectations, R will prefer not to use q in the first place. Thus,
for all equilibria to be IE, we need to impose an upper bound δ¯ on players’ patience. It is
worth emphasizing, however, that the conditions identified in the proof of Proposition 4
are by no means necessary for the existence of IE.19
4.3 The value of inefficient instruments
In reality, the menu of available policy instruments is often endogenous. For example, if
environmental policy is chosen at the local level or by a regulatory body, then the instru-
ments that are available may be restricted by the federal government and, in such cases,
it is not at all clear whether an inefficient policy instrument would, or should, be made
available to decision makers. As argued in Section 2, there is no social welfare gain to be
had from the existence of q in a static environment; the question is whether this holds
in dynamic settings. The answer is “yes”: allowing for an inefficient policy instrument
can lead to Pareto superior equilibria in the dynamic game. Although a more general
existence result is available (Austen-Smith et al. 2019, Proposition 5), we establish the
efficiency claim here with a simple two-state example. Additionally, the example pro-
vides insight on the environments in which q can be expected to be welfare improving.
Let (npq) denote the original game, let (np) denote the game in which the
inefficient instrument is unavailable, and let (nq) denote the game in which the effi-
cient instrument is unavailable. Say that one equilibrium is Pareto superior to another
if at the beginning of the game, for any realization of the initial state, both players get a
strictly greater continuation payoff in the former. Then we have the following result.
19A similar result for the exclusive existence of EE holds. For instance, for any m and δ, one can show that
as d becomes sufficiently large, that is, as extreme states become sufficiently likely, all equilibria are EE.
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Proposition 5. Suppose there exist θ < θ¯ and π ∈ (01) such that in every period t, with
probability 1−π, θ(t)= θ, and with probability π, θ(t)= θ¯.
(i) There exists an equilibrium of (npq) that is Pareto superior to any equilibrium
of (np) if and only if
wL < θ≤min{wi + ei} ≤max{wi + ei}< θ¯ (3)
δ(1−π)(wR − θ) >
(
1− δ(1−π))(θ¯−wR) (4)
(ii) Furthermore, all equilibria of (npq) are Pareto superior to all equilibria of
(np) if and only if (3), (4), and the following inequality hold:
eL >
δπ
1− δ(θ¯−wL)+
1− δπ
1− δ (θ−wL) (5)
(iii) For any (wLwReLeR), there exists δ and F—i.e., a triple (θ θ¯π)—such that all
equilibria of (npq) are Pareto superior to all equilibria of (np).
Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) above hold unchanged if we replace (npq) by (nq).
Proposition 5 part (i) characterizes the conditions under which adding q can make
both players strictly better off. To understand the intuition for, and implications of, these
conditions, note first that condition (3) is essentially equivalent to the condition (1) in
the two-period example of Section 2 and has a similar interpretation as in the two-period
setup.20 Specifically, the last three inequalities in (3) mean that when choosing between
n and q, players’ static preferences are the same, so in the game (nq), there exists an
equilibrium in which players agree to implement n in state θ and q in state θ¯. The first
inequality in (3) means that p is L’s most preferred policy in either state, so status quo
p is never repealed. Hence, in the game (np), if n is the status quo and R’s prefer-
ence for n over p in the low state θ is stronger than her preference for p over n in the
high state θ¯, R will not approve intervening with p and in any equilibrium, players will
stay at n forever. This is assured by condition (4), and in that case, both players are
strictly worse off in this nonintervention equilibrium path than in the equilibrium path
of (nq), described above.
Now consider the game (npq). Since, under (4), R does not approve p, adding
p to the game leaves the incentives underlying the equilibria of (nq) unchanged.
Agreeing to implement n in state θ and q in state θ¯, therefore, is also an equilibrium
of (npq), and both players strictly prefer it to the unique equilibrium path of (np).
Hence, for the inefficient instrument to be beneficial in some equilibrium, players’ de-
gree of polarization must be sufficiently large so that they disagree sufficiently often on
when to repeal p, but not so large that they agree sufficiently often on when to repeal q.
Part (ii) shows that the additional condition (5) is required to ensure both players
are strictly better off in all equilibria of (npq) relative to (np). The reason is that IE
20The only difference between conditions (1) and (3) is that the former requires θ < wR, but this extra
condition is implied by (4).
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and EE may coexist in (npq): staying with n indefinitely, as in the unique equilibrium
path of (np), may remain an equilibrium in (npq), leaving L and R indifferent be-
tween the two games. To see how this can occur, suppose that L threatens to approve
only p if ever q is implemented. If such a threat is credible, R never approves q and no
intervention is ever implemented. Condition (5) guarantees that no such threat is cred-
ible: when eL is sufficiently large, L prefers to accept n rather than stay at q in state θ.
Thus, to guarantee that both players benefit unambiguously from the availability of q, q
must be sufficiently inefficient for the less interventionist players.
It is worth noting how the conditions of Proposition 5 depend on π and δ. From
(4) and (5), the set of wR, wL, and eL that satisfies these conditions expands as π falls.
Hence, both players are more likely to benefit from q if the state in which they disagree
over intervening with the efficient policy becomes more likely. In addition, as δ increases
and players become more patient, the set of wR satisfying (4) increases and a welfare
improving IE equilibrium, therefore, becomes more likely. However, the right-hand side
of (5) first decreases and then increases with δ. Hence, to benefit unambiguously from
the presence of q, players should be sufficiently, but not excessively, patient.21 Part (iii)
further states that for any payoff parameters, the availability of q unambiguously leads
to Pareto better equilibria for some degree of patience and some specification of F .
The main message of Proposition 5 remains unchanged even if we allow for non-
Markov strategies. Indeed, if conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied, then there exists a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of (npq) that Pareto dominates any SPNE
of (np). To see this, simply note that under condition (3), having policy p forever gives
a strictly greater payoff toL than any other policy path. So in any SPNE of (np), p stays
in place forever once it becomes the status quo. Thus, condition (4) implies than in any
SPNE of (np), the initial status quo n stays in place forever. The Markov equilibrium σ
of (npq) in which players agree to implement n in state θ and q in state θ¯ is a fortiori
a SPNE, and from what precedes, it Pareto dominates any SPNE of (np). Note further
that under conditions (3) and (4), allowing for non-Markov strategies does not lead to
more efficient outcomes. Since under (3), in any SPNE, p stays in place forever once
implemented, the path of σ is the most preferred path of R among all such paths, so σ
is R’s most preferred SPNE. Outside of the environment of Proposition 5, allowing for
non-Markov strategies may expand the set of equilibria to include more efficient equi-
libria, but the main qualitative message of the paper should survive, namely, that q may
be used in equilibrium and ruling out q, either by selecting a different equilibrium or by
allowing players to commit not to use q, can make them worse off.
5. Volatility and persistent states
Until now, states, and thereby players’ state-contingent preferences, have been assumed
i.i.d. draws over time. In many applications, however, there may be periods of relative
21The non-monotonic impact of δ on the value of inefficient instruments is not an artifact of the two-
state distributions considered in Proposition 5. Condition (3) guarantees that players are in full ideological
agreement when choosing between the inefficient instrument q and no intervention n. This makes q partic-
ularly attractive. If the distribution of the state has full support, sufficiently patient players may introduce
an inefficient gridlock also to the choice between n and q. As a result, unlike in the two-state case, q may
not strictly improve both players’ payoffs if players are sufficiently patient and, further, an IE may not exist.
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stability when players do not expect to change their positions, other things equal, and
there may also be periods in which new information about the desirability of an inter-
vention arrives frequently, resulting in frequent revisions of the relevant policy prefer-
ences.22 Our main argument, therefore, that one reason for rational legislators to reject
an efficient policy in favor of an inefficient policy is because inefficient policies are easier
to repeal, is attenuated to the extent that it depends essentially on the i.i.d. assumption.
Consequently, we extend the argument to a more general environment in which the i.i.d.
assumption is relaxed to permit serial correlation.
To capture the possibility that states may persist across periods in an analytically
tractable way and to allow for players’ expectations regarding the persistence of the cur-
rent state to vary over time, consider, for every period t, a tuple (θ(t) v(t)) ∈ R × [01].
Assume that the evolution of such tuples across periods satisfies the following transition
property: for all t,
(
θ(t + 1) v(t + 1))=
{(
θ(t) v(t)
)
with probability 1− v(t)(
θ(t + 1) v(t + 1))∼H with probability v(t)
where H is some joint c.d.f. As before, θt is the underlying policy-relevant state. We
interpret the additional variable v(t) as a measure of volatility of the current policy-
relevant state θ(t) or, equivalently, of players’ period t expectations over θ(t + 1). In
each period t, the state θ(t) persists into period t + 1 with probability (1− v(t)) and, for
simplicity, assume the volatility v(t) also persists into period t + 1; with probability v(t),
θ(t + 1) and v(t + 1) are drawn according to the joint c.d.f. H. Thus, the volatility of
future state-contingent policy preferences is redrawn if and only if the state-contingent
policy preferences are redrawn.
Note that the evolution of the state collapses to the basic i.i.d. model if v(t) ≡ 1 for
all t. Similarly, v(t) ≡ 0 for all t implies preferences never change, while v(t) ≡ v ∈ (01)
for all t implies the degree of volatility is fixed. In the following proposition, however,
we consider the general model described above in which the volatility evolves over time
and v(t) is redrawn every period according to H.
Proposition 6. In any equilibrium σ , there exists v¯ ∈ (01] such that q is not imple-
mented when the realization of volatility is v < v¯, but q is implemented with positive
probability under status quo n when the realization of volatility is v > v¯. Moreover, for
any (wLwReLeR), for all δ sufficiently close to 1, there exists distribution H with full
support on R× [01] such that, for all equilibria, v¯ < 1.
Proposition 6 states that q is implemented on the equilibrium path only in suffi-
ciently volatile economic environments. Intuitively, when players expect the current
22A painful example is the U.S. Congressional response to the 2008 fiscal collapse. For some years be-
fore 2008, the U.S. economy was growing strongly and atypical Congressional economic interventions were
minimal. The fall of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent turmoil in much of the global economy led to
serious Congressional disagreement regarding the appropriate level and duration of any extraordinary in-
tervention, from whether to bail out banks or the car industry to extensions of unemployment and welfare
benefits.
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state to be lasting (v(t)≤ v¯), strategic concerns regarding the possibility of conflict over
repealing today’s intervention tomorrow, say, are muted and any intervention is effi-
cient. When the economic environment is expected to be transient, however (v(t) > v¯),
today’s choice is likely to need revision in the next period, making salient exactly the
sorts of strategic consideration underlying the use of inefficient interventions.23
6. Conclusion
The continued and widespread use of inefficient policy interventions in more-or-less
democratic political systems is a puzzle. For example, while economists uniformly rec-
ommend regulating emissions with Pigou taxes, technology and quantity controls are
the most adopted instruments in reality. Why would rational politicians agree on the
use of Pareto-dominated policy instruments? In our model, an inefficient policy inter-
vention may arise even when there is no salient legislative history or vested interest.
Rather, an inefficient policy may be chosen precisely because it is inefficient and the en-
vironment is expected to change in the future. From this perspective, the puzzle alluded
to above can be understood without pointing to informational asymmetries, interest
group influence, or differential distributional implications of alternative policy instru-
ments among the electorate at large.
With a heterogeneous legislature and multiple veto players, inefficient interventions
are politically easier than efficient interventions to repeal in dynamic environments sub-
ject to policy-relevant stochastic shocks. In addition, since inefficient interventions are
easier to repeal, heterogeneous veto players, differentiated only by the threshold shocks
beyond which they judge some policy intervention to be warranted, can be more will-
ing to agree on responding to a sufficiently severe downside shock with an inefficient
instrument. As a consequence, inefficient interventions are more likely to be used in
(moderately) polarized political environments and for issues where the fundamentals
are subject to change over time.
Appendix
A.1 Notations and preliminary lemmas
Notation 1. Throughout the Appendix, the term “strategy” refers to a Markov strategy
and the term “equilibrium” refers to a Markov perfect equilibrium, and we allow mixed
strategies (in the behavioral sense). That is, we assume that in each period t, each player
23Note that in the special case of the model in which v(t) ≡ vo for all t for some vo, Proposition 6 is
actually vacuous, as it simply states that either the equilibrium is IE (if vo > v¯) or is EE (if vo < v¯), but it
does not deliver any comparative statics with respect to vo and v¯ depends on vo. Such comparative statics
are in general ambiguous. To see why, note that as vo increases, today’s preferences are more likely to be
transient, so players care less about the flow-payoff they get from today’s policy relative to which policy
gives them a better bargaining position tomorrow. This makes the less interventionist player more willing
to intervene with q than with p. However, an increase in vo also makes tomorrow’s preferences more likely
to be transient. This makes the more interventionist player less willing to repeal any intervention tomorrow.
The greater inertia under q or p has an ambiguous effect on the willingness of the less interventionist player
to use q.
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i privately observes the realization of a payoff-irrelevant random variable ρi(t) and can
condition her action in period t only on payoff-relevant variables and on ρi(t), where
{ρL(t) : t ∈N} and {ρR(t) : t ∈N} are i.i.d. and independent of each other.
For a given strategy profile σ , the policy outcome in period t ∈ N with status
quo s(t) ∈ {npq} can depend on the following exogenous stochastic factors: the
state of nature θ(t), the identity p(t) of the proposer recognized in period t, and
the realization of players’ private randomization devices (ρL(t)ρR(t)). Let υ(t) ≡
(θ(t)p(t)ρL(t)ρR(t)) denote the random variable that encodes this information. We
refer to υ(t) as the state of the world in period t. Let ϒ denote the set of possible states
of the world. Note that {υ(t) : t ∈N} is i.i.d. Let μ denote its probability distribution. For
any state of the world υ ∈ ϒ, θ(υ) denotes the corresponding realization of the state of
nature. For all sx ∈ {npq}, ϒσ(sx) denotes the set of realizations of the state of the
world for which status quo s leads to outcome x if players play σ .
Let V σi (θx) denote the expected discounted payoff for player i ∈ {LR} from imple-
menting policy x ∈ {npq} in period 0 conditional on θ(0)= θ and on players playing σ
from period 1 onward.
Lemma 2 characterizes the continuation payoff parameters introduced in Lemma 1
(equilibrium existence will be established latter on). Lemma 2 also derives some nec-
essary conditions on (wσeσ) for σ to be an equilibrium. Lemma 3 provides necessary
and sufficient conditions on (wσeσ) for σ to be an EE. These conditions allow us to de-
rive conditions on the primitive parameters under which no EE exists and, thus, under
which all equilibria are IE (see the proof of Proposition 3).
Definition 2. Let (wc ec) ∈ R4. A strategy profile σ is subgame perfect for the con-
tinuation payoff parameters (wc ec) ∈ R4 if σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
game in which players play a single period of  with payoffs V defined by, for all θ ∈ R,
Vi(θp)− Vi(θn)= θ−wci and Vi(θp)− Vi(θq)= eci .
Lemma 2. Let σ be a strategy profile.
(A) Recall the definition of V σ from Notation 1. There exist wσi ∈ R and eσi ∈ R such
that, for all θ ∈R,
V σi (θp)− V σi (θn)= θ−wσi
V σi (θp)− V σi (θq)= eσi
V σi (θq)− V σi (θn)= θ−wσi − eσi 
(6)
Expression
wσi −wi
δ (
eσi −ei
δ ) is equal to the expected payoff gain for player i of having
initial status quo n (p) instead of p (q) in the game  given continuation play σ .
(B) Let wσi and e
σ
i be the continuation payoff parameters of σ , as characterized in (6).
Then σ is an equilibrium if and only if σ is subgame perfect for wσi and e
σ
i in the
sense of Definition 2.
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(C) If σ is an equilibrium, then
wσi −wi
δ
=
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)
(
wσi − θ(υ)
)
dμ(υ)−
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nq)
eσi dμ(υ) (7)
eσi − ei
δ
=
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qq)
eσi dμ(υ)+
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσi
)
dμ(υ)
+
∫
ϒσ(pn)∩ϒσ(qq)
(
wσi + eσi − θ(υ)
)
dμ(υ) (8)
Proof. By definition, V σi (θp) − V σi (θn) is the sum of the flow-payoff gain from im-
plementing p instead of n in t = 0 when θ(0) = θ and δ times the continuation payoff
gain from period 1 onward from having s(1)= p instead of s(1)= n, given continuation
play σ in t ≥ 1. So using Notation 1, we can write
V σi (θp)− V σi (θn)
= θ−wi + δ
∑
xy∈{npq}
∫
ϒσ(px)∩ϒσ(ny)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)x
)− V σi (θ(υ) y))dμ(υ)
Therefore, to prove the first line of (6), it suffices to set
wσi ≡wi − δ
∑
xy∈{npq}
∫
ϒσ(nx)∩ϒσ(py)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)x
)− V σi (θ(υ) y))dμ(υ) (9)
An analogous reasoning on the continuation payoff gain from implementing p instead
of q proves the second line of (6) with
eσi ≡ ei + δ
∑
xy∈{npq}
∫
ϒσ(px)∩ϒσ(qy)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)x
)− V σi (θ(υ) y))dμ(υ) (10)
The third line of (6) is simply the sum of the first two.
Using Definition 2 and part A, part B simply restates the fact that σ is a Markov-
perfect equilibrium if and only if in any period t, σ prescribes actions that are subgame
perfect given continuation play σ from t + 1 onward.
To prove part C, let σ be an equilibrium. Using (10), we get
eσi −ei
δ =∑
xy∈{npq} eσi (x y), where
eσi (x y)≡
∫
ϒσ(px)∩ϒσ(qy)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)x
)− V σi (θ(υ) y))dμ(υ) (11)
For x = y clearly eσi (x y) = 0. Consider next (x y) = (qn), that is, status quo p is
replaced by q and status quo q is replaced by n. Since σ is an equilibrium, for all
υ ∈ ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(qn), both players must weakly prefer to implement q to p and n
to q in period 1, given continuation play σ . Moreover, one of the players must be in-
different between implementing n and q, because if both players strictly preferred to
implement n to q in state v, then under status quo p, either veto player would accept
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n, so proposing n instead of q in that period would be a profitable deviation for the
proposer. Therefore, for all υ ∈ ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(qn), V σi (θ(υ)q) − V σi (θ(υ)n) = 0 for
some player i, and using (6), this implies θ(υ) − wσi − eσi = 0. But that equality is sat-
isfied only in states of the world for which the corresponding realization of the state of
nature is θ(υ) = wσi + eσi , but since F is continuous, this happens with probability 0,
so μ(ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(qn)) = 0 and so eσi (qn) = 0. In the case (x y) = (pn), an analo-
gous reasoning implies that μ(ϒσ(qp) ∩ ϒσ(pn)) = 0, so eσi (pn) = 0. Consider now
(x y) = (qp), that is, status quo p is replaced by q and vice versa. Since σ is an equi-
librium, for all υ ∈ ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(qp), V σi (θ(υ)p) = V σi (θ(υ)q) for both players, so
from (11), eσi (qp) = 0. The only remaining cases are (x y) equal to (pq), (pn), and
(nq), so (10) becomes
eσi − ei
δ
=
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qq)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)p
)− V σi (θ(υ)q))dμ(υ)
+
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)p
)− V σi (θ(υ)n))dμ(υ)
+
∫
ϒσ(pn)∩ϒσ(qq)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)n
)− V σi (θ(υ)q))dμ(υ)
Substituting (6) into the above expression, we obtain (8).
The proof of (7) follows a similar logic. Using (9), we get that
wσi −wi
δ =∑
xy∈{npq}wσi (x y), where
wσi (x y)≡
∫
ϒσ(px)∩ϒσ(ny)
(
V σi
(
θ(υ)x
)− V σi (θ(υ) y))dμ(υ)
Using the same steps as those used to prove μ(ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(qn)) = 0, and revers-
ing the role of p and q, we obtain that μ(ϒσ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(nq)) = 0, so wσi (nq) = 0. An
analogous reasoning implies that μ(ϒσ(pq) ∩ ϒσ(np)) = 0, so wσi (qp) = 0. More-
over, for all υ ∈ ϒσ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(np), each player i must be indifferent between im-
plementing n and p, so θ(υ) − wσi − eσi = 0. Since F is continuous, this implies that
μ(ϒσ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(np)) = 0, so wσi (np) = 0. The only remaining cases left are (x y)
equal to (pn), (pq), and (qn). Equation (7) follows then from substituting these three
cases into the right-hand side of (9) and using (6).
Lemma 3 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for EE). (A) Let σ be an EE. Then eσL > 0,
eσR ≥ 0, wσL <wL <wR <wσR, ϒσ(qq)⊆ϒσ(pp), and for all i ∈ {LR},
wσi −wi
δ
=
∫ wσR
wσL
(
wσi − θ
)
dF(θ) (12)
(B) For any σ that is EE, there exists σ ′ that is also EE and is such that players never
propose q under any status quo, wσ
′ =wσ and for all i ∈ {LR},
eσ
′
i − ei
δ
=
∫ min{wσL+eσ ′L wσR}
wσL
bR(θq)
(
θ−wσi
)
dF(θ) (13)
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(C) Reciprocally, if there exists (w∗ e∗) ∈R4 such that e∗R ≥ 0 and such that
w∗i −wi
δ
=
∫ w∗R
w∗L
(
w∗i − θ
)
dF(θ) (14)
e∗i − ei
δ
=
∫ min{w∗L+e∗Lw∗R}
w∗L
bR(θq)
(
θ−w∗i
)
dF(θ) (15)
then there exists an EE σ such that the corresponding continuation payoff parame-
ters (wσeσ) (as defined in Lemma 2A) satisfy (wσeσ)= (w∗ e∗).
Proof. Part A. Let σ be an arbitrary EE.
Step A1: wσL <w
σ
R and for all i ∈ {LR}, we have
wσi −wi
δ
=
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)
(
wσi − θ(υ)
)
dμ(υ) (16)
Since σ is an EE, μ(ϒσ(nq))= 0. Substituting the latter equality into (7), we obtain (16).
Taking differences across players in (16) and solving for wσR −wσL, we obtain wσR −wσL =
wR−wL
1−δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)) > 0.
Step A2: eσL ≥ 0 and eσR ≥ 0. Note first that in any state θ > wσk + eσk , from Lemma 2A,
player k strictly prefers implementing q to n, given continuation play σ , and if eσk < 0,
k also prefers implementing q to p. So if eσi < 0 for some i ∈ {LR}, then since σ
is an equilibrium, in any period t in which s(t) = n, i is the proposer, and θ(t) >
maxk∈{LR}{wσk + eσk }, the other player j must accept proposal q, so i must propose q,
which contradicts σ being an EE.
Step A3: Modulo a zero measure set, ϒσ(pp) = {υ ∈ ϒ : θ(υ) > wσL} and ϒσ(nn) =
{υ ∈ ϒ : θ(υ) < wσR}. From Lemma 2A, for all υ ∈ ϒ such that θ(υ) > wσL, L strictly
prefers implementing p to n given continuation play σ , and since σ is an equilibrium,
υ /∈ ϒσ(pn). Since σ is an EE, μ(ϒσ(pq)) = 0. By definition of ϒσ , (ϒσ(px))x∈{npq}
is a partition of ϒ, so necessarily, υ ∈ ϒσ(pp). Conversely, for all υ ∈ ϒ such that
θ(υ) < wσL, from Step A1, θ(υ) < w
σ
R, so both players strictly prefer implementing n to
p given continuation play σ . Since σ is an equilibrium, necessarily, υ /∈ϒσ(pp). Since
F is continuous, the set of υ such that θ(υ)=wσL has probability 0, which completes the
proof of the first equality in Step A3.
From Lemma 2A, for all υ ∈ ϒ such that θ(υ) < wσR, R strictly prefers implementing
n to p given continuation play σ , and since σ is an equilibrium, υ /∈ ϒσ(np). Since σ
is an EE, μ(ϒσ(nq)) = 0. Since (ϒσ(nx))x∈{npq} is a partition of ϒ, necessarily, υ ∈
ϒσ(nn). Conversely, for all υ ∈ϒ such that θ(υ) > wσR, from Step A1, θ(υ) > wσL, so from
Lemma 2A, both players strictly prefer implementing p to n, given continuation play σ .
Therefore, υ /∈ϒσ(nn). The second equality in Step A3 follows then from the continuity
of F .
Step A4: (wσLw
σ
R) satisfies (12) and w
σ
L < wL < wR < w
σ
R. From Step A3, modulo
a zero measure set, ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(nn) = {υ ∈ ϒ : θ(υ) ∈ (wσLwσR)}. Substituting this
equality into (16), we obtain (12). Step A1 and the assumption that F has full support
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imply
∫ wσR
wσL
(wσL − θ)dF(θ) < 0 <
∫ wσR
wσL
(wσR − θ)dF(θ). Together with (12), the above in-
equalities imply wσL <wL <wR <w
σ
R.
Step A5: eσL > 0. Let us first prove that μ(ϒ
σ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(qq)) = 0. Suppose to
the contrary that the latter probability is positive. Then from Lemma 2A, for some
υ ∈ϒσ(pn)∩ϒσ(qq), both players strictly prefer implementing n to p and one player
weakly prefers implementing q to n, given continuation play σ . From Lemma 2A, this
means that mini{wσi + eσi } ≤ θ(υ) < wσL and, therefore, mini{wσi + eσi }<wσL, a contradic-
tion to Steps A1 and A2.
Substituting μ(ϒσ(pn)∩ϒσ(qq))= 0 into (8), we get
eσi − ei
δ
=
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qq)
eσi dμ(υ)+
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσi
)
dμ(υ) (17)
From Step A3, for almost all υ ∈ϒσ(pp), θ(υ) > wσL, so (17) implies eσL ≥ eL > 0.
Step A6: ϒσ(qq) ⊆ ϒσ(pp). Let υ ∈ ϒσ(qq). Since σ is an equilibrium, in state
υ, one player weakly prefers implementing q to n given continuation play σ , so θ(υ) ≥
min{wσL + eσLwσR + eσR}. From Steps A1, A2, and A5, the latter inequality implies θ(υ) >
wσL. From Step A3, υ ∈ϒσ(pp).
Part B. Recall that an EE is an equilibrium in which q is never implemented on path
given initial status quo n. This definition does not prevent players from proposing and
implementing q under status quo q, and this may happen in an EE σ such that eσk = 0 for
some k, for such EE, formula (12) is more complicated. So in this part, we prove that for
any EE σ , there always exists an EE σ ′ such that wσ ′ = wσ and q is never implemented
even under status quo q. We construct σ ′ as the limit of a sequence (σk)k∈N defined re-
cursively from σ as follows. We set σ0 = σ . For any k≥ 0, we define σk+1 as a function of
σk as follows. Consider first the action nodes of veto player i ∈ {LR}. When comparing
n and p, i plays σ . When comparing p and q, i votes for p. When comparing n and q, i
votes for q when θ(υ) > wσi + eσ
k
i and for n otherwise. Consider now the action nodes of
proposer i ∈ {LR}. When the status quo is n or p, i plays σ . When the status quo is q, L
proposes n when θ≤wσL and p otherwise, and R proposes n when θ≤min{wσL+eσ
k
L w
σ
R}
and p otherwise.
Step B1: For all k ∈ N, wσk = wσ and eσ1L ≤ eσ
0
L . By construction, for all k ∈ N, σk
prescribes the same actions as σ when neither the status quo nor the proposal is q, and
these actions never lead to outcome q. So the value of the game  with initial status
quo n (p) is the same with continuation play σk and σ . From Lemma 2A, this implies
wσ
k = wσ . When the status quo is q, by construction of σ1, σ1 always implements n or
p, and σ1 prescribes actions that are subgame perfect given continuation play σ . So the
actions prescribed by σ and σ1 under status quo q may differ only in an action node
in which one player is indifferent between two actions. Lemma 2A implies that a given
player can be indifferent between implementing n and p (n and q) only in a unique state.
Since F is continuous, this means that she can be indifferent between two actions in a
nonnegligible set of states only when one action leads to outcome p whereas the other
leads to outcome q (and when eσR = 0). In those cases, σ1 always prescribes R to choose
p, which is what L prefers given continuation play σ since from part A of this lemma,
Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments 1511
eσL > 0. So under status quo q, L is weakly better off when σ
1 is played than when σ is
played in the current period, given continuation play σ . Since the continuation paths of
σ1 and σ coincide under status quo n or p, this implies that under status quo q, L weakly
prefers continuation play σ1 to continuation play σ . From Lemma 2A, this means that
eσ
1
L ≤ eσ
0
L .
Step B2: For all k ∈N, eσkL > 0 and
eσ
k+1
i − ei
δ
=
∫ min{wσL+eσkL wσR}
wσL
bR(θq)
(
θ−wσi
)
dF(θ) (18)
We prove Step B2 by induction. Since σ0 = σ is an EE, part A of this lemma implies
eσ
0
L > 0. Suppose now e
σk
L > 0 for some k ∈ N, and let us show (18) and eσ
k+1
L > 0. From
Lemma 2A, (eσ
k+1
L − ei)/δ is the expected payoff gain from having status quo p instead
of q given continuation play σk+1. To compute it, note that from part A of this lemma,
wσL < w
σ
R, and since e
σk
L > 0, we have w
σ
L < min{wσL + eσ
k
L w
σ
R}. So by construction of
σk+1, on path, status quo q and p both lead to outcome n when θ < wσL, and they both
lead to outcome p when θ > wσR, when θ ∈ (wσLwσR) and L is the proposer, and when
θ ∈ (min{wσL + eσ
k
L w
σ
R}wσR) and R is the proposer. Modulo a negligible set of states, the
only remaining case is when R is the proposer and θ ∈ (wσLmin{wσL + eσ
k
L w
σ
R}). In such
cases, status quo q and p lead to outcome n and p, respectively, so from Lemma 2A, the
relative continuation payoff gain is θ−wσk+1i = θ−wσi . Integrating over all these cases,
we obtain (18). From part A of this lemma, wσL <w
σ
R, so (18) implies e
σk+1
L > eL > 0.
Step B3: For all k ≥ 1, eσk+1L ≤ eσ
k
L and e
σk+1
R ≥ eσ
k
R . We prove Step B3 by induction.
From Steps B1 and B2, eσ
1
L ≤ eσ
0
L . Suppose now e
σk+1
L ≤ eσ
k
L for some k ∈N. From Step B2,
eσ
k+2
i − eσ
k+1
i = δ
∫ min{wσL+eσk+1L wσR}
min{wσL+eσ
k
L w
σ
R}
bR(θq)
(
θ−wσi
)
dF(θ)
Since eσ
k
L ≤ eσ
k−1
L , the right-hand side of the above equality is negative for i = L and
positive for i=R.
Step B4: σk+1 prescribes subgame-perfect actions given continuation play σk. From
Part A of this lemma, eσ
0
R ≥ 0. Steps B2 and B3 imply then that for all i ∈ {LR} and k ∈N,
eσ
k
i ≥ 0. So using Lemma 2A, one can check check that by construction of (σk)k∈N, σk+1
prescribes the veto player to approve (reject) the proposal when she strictly prefers the
proposal (status quo) given continuation play σk, and that σk+1 prescribes the proposer
to propose the policy that she prefers among those accepted by the veto player.
Step B5: σ ′ ≡ limk→∞ σ exists and satisfies the properties stated in part B. From Steps
B1 and B3, wσ
k
i and e
σk
i have a limit as k → ∞, and since σk+1 is a cutoff strategy in
which the cutoffs are continuous functions of wσ
k
i and e
σk
i , it has a limit σ
′. From
Step B4, by continuity, σ ′ is an equilibrium, and by construction of (σk)k∈N, σ ′ never
prescribes proposal q, so σ is an EE. Taking the limit in (18), we obtain (13).
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Part C. Suppose (w∗ e∗) ∈ R4 solves (14) and (15) with e∗R ≥ 0. Construct a strategy
profile σ as follows. Consider first the action nodes of veto player i ∈ {LR}. When com-
paring n and p, i votes for p when θ > w∗i and for n otherwise. When comparing p and
q, i votes for p. When comparing n and q, i votes for q when θ(υ) > w∗i + e∗i and for n
otherwise. Consider now the action nodes of proposer i ∈ {LR}. When the status quo is
n or p, i proposes p when θ > w∗i and n otherwise, When the status quo is q, L proposes
n when θ ≤ w∗L and p otherwise, and R proposes n when θ ≤ min{w∗L + e∗Lw∗R} and p
otherwise. By construction, q is never implemented on path. Therefore, to complete
the proof, it suffices to show that σ is an equilibrium. From Lemma 2B, it suffices to
show that σ is subgame perfect given continuation payoff parameters (w∗ e∗), and that
(wσeσ) (as defined in Lemma 2A) coincides with (w∗ e∗). This is what Steps C1 to C3
below do.
Step C1: σ is subgame perfect for the continuation payoff parameters (w∗ e∗) in
the sense of Definition 2. By assumption, e∗R ≥ 0, and since e∗ satisfies (15), we have
e∗L ≥ eL > 0, so both players always weakly prefer to implement p to q. So one can eas-
ily check that by construction of σ , σ prescribes either veto players to accept (reject)
a proposal when it gives her a greater (lesser) continuation payoff, given continuation
payoff parameters (w∗ e∗). Likewise, σ prescribes either proposer to propose the policy
that gives her the greatest continuation payoff among those accepted by the veto player,
given continuation payoff parameters (w∗ e∗).
Step C2: wσ = w∗. Since w∗ satisfies (14), the same reasoning as in Step A1 implies
w∗L <w
∗
R. By construction of σ , q is never implemented on path, and status quo n and p
lead to different outcomes only when θ ∈ (w∗Lw∗R), in which case either status quo stay
in place, and the corresponding continuation payoff gain is wσi − θ. From Lemma 2A,
this means that
wσi −wi
δ =
∫ w∗R
w∗L
(wσi − θ)dF(θ). This equation can be viewed as a linear
equation in wσi , and it has a unique solution. From (14), w
∗
i is also a solution to that
equation, so wσi =w∗i .
Step C3: eσ = e∗. The same reasoning as in Step B2 (taking wσ = w∗ and eσkL = e∗L)
shows that by construction of σ , modulo a negligible set of states, status quo p and q
lead to different outcomes only when R is the proposer and θ ∈ (w∗Lmin{w∗L + e∗Lw∗R}),
in which case status quos p and q lead to outcomes p and n, respectively, and the
corresponding continuation payoff gain is θ − w∗i . Therefore, Lemma 2A implies that
eσi −ei
δ =
∫ min{w∗L+e∗Lw∗R}
w∗L
bR(θq)(θ−w∗i ) dF(θ). Together with (15), that equation implies
eσi = e∗i .
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. The second claim of Lemma 1 follows from Lemma 2A. The rest of
the proof establishes the first claim, i.e., equilibrium existence. For all i ∈ {LR}, let i
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be a correspondence defined on R such that for all eci ∈R,
i
(
eci
)≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[01] if eci = 0
0 if eci < 0
1 if eci > 0
(19)
Define the correspondence ≡ (LR).
The structure of the proof is as follows. In Step 1, for any continuation payoff pa-
rameters (wc ec) ∈ R4, we construct a set of strategy profiles that are subgame perfect
for the continuation payoff parameters (wc ec) in the sense of Definition 2. In particu-
lar, for any given (wc ec), player i has strict preferences between n and p and between n
and q for almost all realizations of θ, and we assume then that when indifferent, player
i takes action that results in the implementation of n. Hence, we uniquely determine
the subgame-perfect behavior of player i when choosing between n and any interven-
tion. When choosing between p and q, we allow each player to randomize, and we use
πi to denote the probability that i chooses to implement q. Hence, for any (wc ec) and
any mixing rule π ∈ [01]2, we construct a unique strategy profile. Let σ(πwc ec) de-
note this strategy profile, and let wσ(πw
cec) and eσ(πw
cec) be the unique continuation
payoff parameters associated with this strategy profile as defined in Lemma 2. From
(19), whenever π ∈ (ec), σ(πwc ec) is subgame-perfect for the continuation payoff
parameters (wc ec). We define the correspondence  that maps R4 × [01]2 into itself
as24

(
wcecπ
)≡ {(wσ(πwcec) eσ(πwcec)π ′) : π ′ ∈(eσ(πwcec))} (20)
Note that the strategies used to define  are subgame perfect only for π ∈ (ec) and
not for all π ∈ [01]2, but by construction of , if (π∗w∗ e∗) is a fixed point of ,
π∗ ∈(e∗) and σ(π∗w∗ e∗) is subgame perfect for the continuation payoff parameters
(w∗ e∗) = (wσ(π∗w∗e∗) eσ(π∗w∗e∗)). From Lemma 2B, this means that σ(π∗w∗ e∗) is
an equilibrium. Thus, to prove equilibrium existence, it suffices to show that  has a
fixed point. The rest of the proof then checks that  satisfies the conditions of Kaku-
tani’s fixed point theorem. Step 2 shows that there exists a compact and convex set C
such that (C) ⊂ C, Steps 3 and 4 show that the graph of  is closed, and Step 5 shows
that  is convex-valued.
Step 1. For each (πwc ec), we construct a strategy profile σ(πwc ec) that is sub-
game perfect for the continuation payoff parameters (wc ec) (in the sense of Definition 2)
whenever players choose between n and p or n and q, but uses π as the tie-breaking rule
between p and q. Whenever π ∈(ec), this strategy profile is subgame perfect. The con-
struction of σ(πwc ec) is intuitive, but the detailed description below will be useful in
24Note that  is not a mapping from strategy space to strategy space as is usual in fixed-point-type exis-
tence proofs. The reason for this is that the set of strategies that are subgame perfect for the continuation
parameters (wc ec) may be quite complex whenever ec = 0, and showing convexity or contractibility of
such a set may be an issue. Instead, we take as a primitive (wc ec) together with a tie-breaking rule, and
map it into the payoff parameters generated by a strategy that uses this tie-breaking rule and is subgame
perfect with respect to (wc ec) and map it into a set of new tie-breaking rule that are subgame perfect with
respect to eσ(πw
cec).
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Step 3 to show that the continuation payoff parameters derived from σ(πwc ec) are
continuous in (πwc ec). In this description, for brevity, players’ preferences should be
understood as their preferences given continuation payoff parameters (wc ec).
Veto player’s strategy. In any Markov state in which the veto player i ∈ {LR} has the
choice between n and p (n and q), σi prescribes i to choose n when she weakly prefers
implementing n, i.e., when θ≤wci (when θ≤wci + eci ) and σi prescribes i to choose p (q)
otherwise.
When the veto player has to choose between p and q, σi prescribes i to choose p
with probability (henceforth w.p.) πi and q w.p. 1 − πi, irrespective of θ. From (19),
when π ∈(ec), this behavior is subgame perfect given continuation payoff parameters
(wc ec).
Finally, when the status quo is proposed, the action prescribed by σi is irrelevant.
Proposer’s strategy under status quo p. When i weakly prefers p to n or when σj
prescribes j to veto proposal n (i.e., when θ≥wci or θ >wcj ), then σi prescribes proposer
i to propose p w.p. πi and q w.p. 1 − πi (note that by the preceding argument, the
veto player strategy is independent of the proposer’s strategy). When π ∈ (ec), this is
subgame perfect given the veto player’s strategy σj and continuation payoff parameters
(wc ec), because in both cases, i always weakly prefers proposing the status quo p to
proposing n, and from (19), when π ∈(ec), σi prescribes i to propose q only when she
weakly prefers it to p.
The remaining case is when i strictly prefers n to p and σj prescribes j to accept pro-
posal n (i.e., when θi < wc and θj ≤ wc). In this case, from Lemma 2A, the continuation
payoff gain for i from proposing n instead of p is wci − θ, whereas that of proposing q
instead of p is −πjeci . So when wci − θ > −πjeci , proposal n dominates both proposals
q and p, and we set σi to prescribe i to propose n. When wci − θ ≤ −πjeci , proposal n is
dominated by proposal q. So σi prescribes i to propose p w.p. πi and q w.p. 1−πi. From
(19), when π ∈(ec), this is subgame perfect under status quo p given the veto player’s
strategy σj and continuation payoff parameters (wc ec).
Proposer’s strategy under status quo q. The strategy is analogous to the proposer’s
strategy under status quo p, where the role of p and q and their corresponding continu-
ation payoff parameters are reversed.
Proposer’s strategy under status quo n. When i weakly prefers n to p and n to q (i.e.,
when θ ≤min{wci wci + eci }), σi prescribes i to propose n, which is optimal since n is the
status quo.
When i strictly prefers p to n and weakly prefers n to q (i.e., when wci < θ≤wci + eci ),
σ prescribes i to propose p, which is optimal for i irrespective of whether j accepts it.
When i strictly prefers q to n and weakly prefers n to p (i.e., when wci + eci < θ≤wci ),
σ prescribes i to propose q, which is optimal for i irrespective of whether j accepts it.
The only remaining case is when i strictly prefers q and p to n (i.e., when θ >
maxi∈{LR}{wci wci + eci }). In that case, if σj prescribes j to veto both p and q (i.e.,
θ ≤ min{wcj wcj + ecj }), σi prescribes i to propose n. If σj prescribes j to veto q but not
p (i.e., wcj < θ≤wcj + ecj ), σi prescribes i to propose p. If σj prescribes j to veto p but not
q (i.e., wcj +ecj < θ≤wcj ), σi prescribes i to propose q. Finally, if both p and q are accepted
(i.e., θ >min{wcj wcj + ecj }), σi prescribes i to propose p w.p. πi and q w.p. 1−πi.
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Step 2: There exists a compact and convex set C such that (C) ⊂ C. Let B ≡
maxi{|wi|+|ei|+E(|θ|)}
1−δ and C ≡ [−BB]4 × [01]2. The compactness and convexity of C is
obvious. To see why (C) ⊆ C, note that from (2), the flow-payoff difference between
any two policies is bounded by E[|θ| + |wi| + |ei|], so the expected discounted payoff
difference between any two policy paths is bounded by B ≡ E[|θ|]+|wi|+|ei|1−δ . Therefore, by
definition of wσi and e
σ
i (see Lemma 2A), for any strategy profile σ , |wσi |+|eσi | is bounded
by B.
Step 3: The functions (πwc ec) → wσ(πwcec) and (πwc ec) → eσ(πwcec) are con-
tinuous. By construction of σ (see Step 1), for all θ ∈ R, x y ∈ {npq}, (πwc ec) ∈ C,
the probability that in state θ, σ(πwc ec) prescribes the proposer to propose y (the veto
player to accept y) under status quo x is piecewise constant in θ. Moreover, on each of
the intervals on which it is constant in θ, this probability is continuous in (πwc ec), and
the bounds of these intervals depend continuously on (πwc ec). Therefore, the proba-
bility that on the path of σ(πwc ec), status quo x is replaced by policy y in some state
θ is continuous in (πwc ec) except at a finite number of θ. Using Notation 1, the con-
tinuity of F implies then that the expectation of V σ(πw
cec)
i (θx) conditional on θ∼ F is
continuous in (πwc ec). From (9) and (10), this implies that wσ(πw
cec)
i and e
σ(πwcec)
i
are continuous in (πwc ec).
Step 4:  has a closed graph. Let (πkwkek)k∈N and (πˆk wˆk eˆk)k∈N be two
sequences in C that converge to some (π∞w∞ e∞) and (πˆ∞ wˆ∞ eˆ∞)k∈N, respec-
tively, and such that for all k ∈ N, (πˆk wˆk eˆk) ∈ (πkwkek). We need to show that
(πˆ∞ wˆ∞ eˆ∞) ∈ (π∞w∞ e∞). From (20) and (19), (πˆk wˆk eˆk) ∈ (πkwkek) im-
plies that wˆk = wσ(πkwkek), eˆk = eσ(πkwkek), and πˆk ∈ (eˆk). From Step 3, wˆ∞ =
wσ(π
∞w∞e∞) and eˆ∞ = eσ(π∞w∞e∞). So it remains to establish that πˆ∞ ∈(eˆ∞), which
requires that eˆ∞ > 0 implies πˆ∞ = 1 and eˆ∞ < 0 implies πˆ∞ = 0. Note that eˆ∞ > 0 im-
plies eˆk > 0 and, thus, πˆk = 1 for k large enough, so eˆ∞ = 1. A similar argument estab-
lishes the second implication.
Step 5:  is convex-valued. One can immediately check from (19) that (·) is convex-
valued, so from (20),  is also convex-valued.
Proof of Proposition 2. Letσ be an arbitrary IE and let i j ∈ {LR} be such thatwσi ≤
wσj in this equilibrium.
Step 1: μ(ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(qn)) > 0. Since σ is an equilibrium, in any state υ ∈
ϒσ(pn), each player k must prefer implementing n to p given continuation play σ ,
so Lemma 2A implies θ(υ) ≤ wσk and, therefore, wσk + eσk − θ(υ) ≥ eσk . Substituting the
latter inequality in the equilibrium formula for eσk ((8)), we obtain
eσk − ek
δ
≥
∫
(ϒσ(pp)∪ϒσ(pn))∩ϒσ(qq)
eσk dμ(υ)+
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσk
)
dμ(υ)
⇒ eσk ≥
ek + δ
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσk
)
dμ(υ)
1− δμ((ϒσ(pp)∪ϒσ(pn))∩ϒσ(qq))  (21)
Suppose to the contrary that μ(ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(qn)) = 0. Then (21) implies eσL > 0 and
eσR > 0, so both players always strictly prefer to implement p to q given continuation
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play σ . Since σ is an equilibrium, this implies that q is never implemented on path,
which is impossible since σ is an IE.
Step 2: mink∈{LR}wσk < mink∈{LR}(w
σ
k + eσk). Since σ is an equilibrium, for all υ ∈
ϒσ(qn), both players weakly prefer implementing n to q given continuation play σ , so
from Lemma 2A, θ(υ) ≤ wσk + eσk for both k ∈ {LR}. For all υ ∈ ϒσ(pp), at least one
player weakly prefers implementing p to n, i.e., θ(υ) ≥ wσk for some k ∈ {LR}. So for
all υ ∈ μ(ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(qn)), mink∈{LR}wσk ≤ θ(υ) ≤ mink∈{LR}(wσk + eσk). Since from
Step 1, ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn) has positive probability and since F is continuous, the latter
weak inequalities must be strict for some υ ∈ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn), which implies Step 2.
Step 3: eσj ≤ 0 and eσi > ei > 0. Since σ is an equilibrium, for all υ ∈ ϒσ(pp), some
player weakly prefers implementing p to n, so θ(υ) ≥ mink∈{LR}wσk = wσi . Since F is
continuous, this inequality is strict for almost all υ ∈ ϒσ(pp). Substituting θ(υ) > wσi
and Step 1 into (21), we get eσi > ei > 0. As argued in Step 1, since σ is an IE, e
σ
i > 0
implies eσj ≤ 0.
Step 4: wσi < w
σ
j . From Step 3, e
σ
j ≤ 0, so (21) implies
∫
υ∈ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)(θ(υ) −
wσj )dμ(υ) < 0. Therefore, there exists ϒ
o ⊂ ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(qn) such that μ(ϒo) > 0
and for all υo ∈ ϒo, θ(υo) < wσj . From Lemma 2A, the latter inequality implies that
for all υo ∈ ϒo, j strictly prefers implementing n to p given continuation play σ . Since
ϒo ⊂ ϒσ(pp) and σ is an equilibrium, i must weakly prefer implementing p to n in
such states υo, i.e., θ(υo)≥wσi . The latter inequality, together with θ(υo) < wσj , implies
wσi < w
σ
j .
Proof of Proposition 3(i) and (ii) and part (iii) in the case wR −wL → 0.
An equilibrium is either an EE or an IE, so all equilibria are IE if and only if no EE ex-
ist. Lemma 3 implies that no EE exist if and only if there exists no (w∗ e∗) ∈ R2 such
that e∗R ≥ 0, and (14) and (15) hold. The proof proceeds by deriving conditions on the
primitive parameters such that any solution (w∗ e∗) to (14) and (15) must be such that
e∗R < 0.
Step 0: Notation. Condition (14) depends on (we) only through w, so let W ∗(w)
denote the set of w∗ ∈ R2 solving (14) for i = LR. If we fix w∗ and eL, condition (15)
for i = L can be viewed as a fixed point in e∗L; it depends on (we) only through w∗ and
eL, so let E∗L(w
∗ eL) denote the set of e∗L solving (15) for i = L. Since the right-hand
side of (15) is continuous and bounded in e∗L, E
∗
L(w
∗ eL) is nonempty and closed, so let
e∗L(w
∗ eL) denote its minimum. Finally, if we fix w∗, e∗L, and eR, (15) for i=R pins down
a unique e∗R, which we denote e
∗
R(w
∗ e∗LeR).
Step 1: For all w∗ ∈W ∗(w), e∗L(w∗ eL) is weakly increasing in eL, and e∗R(w∗ e∗LeR)
is weakly increasing in eR and weakly decreasing in e∗L. Since the right-hand side of (15)
for i=L is continuous in (eL e∗L) and weakly increasing in eL, Theorem 1 in Villas-Boas
(1997) implies that the smallest fixed point e∗L(w
∗ eL) is weakly increasing in eL. The
comparative statics on e∗R() follow readily from (15) for i = R and the fact that for all
w∗ ∈W ∗(w), w∗L <w∗R (see Lemma 3A).
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Step 2: No EE exists if and only if for all w∗ ∈ W (w), e∗R(w∗ e∗L(w∗ eL) eR) < 0.
As explained at the beginning of this proof, no EE exists if and only if for all solu-
tions to (14) and (15), e∗R < 0. Using the notations of Step 0 and the comparative stat-
ics established in Step 1, no EE exists if and only if e∗R(w
∗ e∗L(w
∗ eL) eR) < 0 for all
w∗ ∈W ∗(w).
Step 3: Proof of Proposition 3(i) and (ii). Part (ii) follows from Step 2 together
with the comparative statics on eL established in Step 1. Likewise, Step 2 together
with the comparative statics on eR established in Step 1 proves part (i) for some
e¯R ∈ [0+∞]˙. To complete the proof of part (ii), it suffices to show that 0 < e¯R <
+∞.
To show that e¯R < +∞, observe first that for any w∗ and e∗L, the right-hand side of
(15) for i = R is bounded below by −E[|θ|] − w∗i , which is independent of e∗L and eR.
So for any w∗, for eR sufficiently large, e∗R(w
∗ e∗L(w
∗ eL) eR) > 0, so an EE exists, as
needed.
Let us now show that e¯R > 0. Let w∗ ∈ W ∗(w). As shown in Step A1 in the proof of
Lemma 3, w∗L < w
∗
R, so (15) for i = L implies that e∗L(w∗ eL) ≥ eL > 0. Finally, (15) for
i=R implies
lim
eR→0
e∗R
(
w∗ e∗L
(
w∗ eL
)
 eR
)= δ∫ min{w∗L+e∗L(w∗eL)w∗R}
w∗L
bR(θq)
(
θ−w∗R
)
dF(θ)
Since F has full support and bR(θq) > b > 0 for all θ ∈ R, the right-hand side of the
above equation is strictly negative. Step 2 implies then that for eR sufficiently small, no
EE exists.
Step 4: Proof of Proposition 3(iii) in the case wR −wL → 0. Suppose Proposition 3(iii)
is false in the case wR − wL → 0. Then from Step 2, there exists (wk)k∈N such that
wkR − wkL → 0 and for all k ∈ N, for all w∗k ∈ W ∗(wk), e∗R(w∗k e∗L(w∗k eL) eR) < 0.
Taking differences across players in (14), we obtain w∗kR − w∗kL =
wkR−wkL
1−δ(F(w∗kR )−F(w∗kL ))
≤
wkR−wkL
1−δ , so w
∗k
R > w
∗k
L and w
∗k
R − w∗kL →k→∞ 0. Since w∗kR > w∗kL , (15) for i = R
implies e∗R(w
∗k e∗L(w
∗k eL) eR) ≥ eR + δ
∫ w∗kR
w
∗k
L
bR(θq)(θ − w∗kR )dF(θ). Since w∗kR −
w∗kL →k→∞ 0, continuity of F implies that the right-hand side of the above inequal-
ity tends to eR > 0 as k → ∞, which contradicts that e∗R(w∗k e∗L(w∗k eL) eR) < 0.
The next lemma will be used to prove Proposition 3(iii).
Lemma 4. If σ is an equilibrium, then
eσi = ei + δ
∫
ϒσ(qq)
eσi dμ(υ)+
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσi
)
dμ(υ) (22)
wσi = wi + δ
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)
(
wσi − θ(υ)
)
dμ(υ)− δ
∫
ϒσ(nq)
eσi dμ(υ) (23)
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and for someD such that (1− δ)2 ≤D≤ 1,
wσR −wσL =
(
1− δμ(ϒσ(qq)))[wR −wL] − δμ(ϒσ(nq))[eR − eL]
D

eσR − eσL =
(
1− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)))[eR − eL]/D
− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))[wR −wL]/D
wσR + eσR −wσL − eσL =
(
1− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(q {nq})))[wR −wL]/D
+ (1− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ {ϒσ(nn)∪ϒσ(nq)}))[eR − eL]/D
(24)
Proof. Step 1: For any equilibrium σ , ϒσ(qq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp), ϒσ(nq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp), and
(23), and (22) hold. That ϒσ(qq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp) in EE follows from Lemma 3A. Suppose
now that σ is an IE. In any υ ∈ ϒσ(qq), some player weakly prefer implementing q to
n, so from Lemma 2A, θ(υ) ≥ mink∈{LR}{wσk + eσk }. Using part (iii) of Proposition 2, the
last inequality implies that θ(υ) >mink∈{LR}wσk , so one player must strictly prefer im-
plementing p to n and, therefore, υ /∈ϒσ(pn). From part (ii) of Proposition 2, eσi > 0, so
from Lemma 2A, υ /∈ ϒσ(pq). Since (ϒσ(px))x∈{npq} is a partition of ϒ, this implies
υ ∈ϒσ(pp), as needed.
To show ϒσ(nq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp), let υ ∈ ϒσ(nq). Since σ is an equilibrium, in state
θ(υ) both players must weakly prefer implementing q to n, so from Lemma 3A, θ(υ) ≥
maxi∈{LR}{wσi + eσi }. Using Lemma 3A (for an EE) and part (iii)of Proposition 2 (for an
IE), we have
max
i∈{LR}
{
wσi + eσi
}≥ min
i∈{LR}
{
wσi + eσi
}
> min
i∈{LR}
{
wσi
}

so θ(υ) >mini∈{LR}{wσi }, which means that one player strictly prefers implementing p
to n and, therefore, υ /∈ ϒσ(pn). Since ϒσ(pq) = ∅, and since (ϒσ(px))x∈{npq} is a
partition of ϒ, necessarily, υ ∈ϒσ(pp), as needed.
Substituting ϒσ(nq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp) into (7), we obtain (23). Finally, by definition of
ϒσ , ϒσ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(pp) = ∅, so ϒσ(qq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp) implies ϒσ(pn) ∩ ϒσ(qq) = ∅.
Substituting the latter equality and ϒσ(qq)⊂ϒσ(pp) into (8), we obtain (22).
Step 2: Proof of the first two lines of (24). Subtracting (23) for i=R from (23) for i=L,
and doing the same for (22), we get
{
wσR −wσL =wR −wL + δμ
(
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn))(wσR −wσL)− δμ(ϒσ(nq))(eσR − eσL)
eσR − eσL = eR − eL + δμ
(
ϒσ(qq)
)(
eσR − eσL
)− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))(wσR −wσL)
The above equations can be viewed as a linear system in wσR −wσL and eσL − eσR. Straight-
forward algebra shows that its solution is given by the first two lines of (24) for
D≡ (1− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)))(1− δμ(ϒσ(qq)))
− δ2μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))μ(ϒσ(nq))
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Step 3: Proof of the third line of (24). From Step 1, ϒσ(qq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp) and, by defi-
nition of ϒσ , ϒσ(qn) and ϒσ(qq) are disjoint, so
μ
(
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))+μ(ϒσ(qq))= μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ {ϒσ(qn)∪ϒσ(qq)}) (25)
From Step 1, ϒσ(nq) ⊂ ϒσ(pp) and, by definition of ϒσ , ϒσ(nn) and ϒσ(nq) are
disjoint, so
μ
(
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn))+μ(ϒσ(nq))= μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ {ϒσ(nn)∪ϒσ(nq)}) (26)
Adding up the first two lines of (24) and substituting (25) and (26) into the corresponding
expression for wσR + eσR −wσL − eσL, we obtain the third line of (24) for the above D.
Step 4: (1 − δ)2 ≤ D ≤ 1. That D ≤ 1 is obvious from the definition of D. To prove
D ≥ (1 − δ)2, observe that ϒσ(qq) and ϒσ(pp) ∩ ϒσ(qn) are disjoint. So ϒσ(qq) is
included into the complement of ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn). Likewise, ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn) and
ϒσ(nq) are disjoint, so ϒσ(pp) ∩ϒσ(nn) is included in the complement of ϒσ(nq).
Therefore,
D = (1− δμ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(nn)))(1− δμ(ϒσ(qq)))
−δ2μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))μ(ϒσ(nq))
≥ (1− δ(1−μ(ϒσ(nq))))(1− δ(1−μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))))
−δ2μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))μ(ϒσ(nq))
= (1− δ)(1− δ+ δ(μ(ϒσ(nq))+μ(ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn))))≥ (1− δ)2
Proof of Proposition 3 part (iii) in the case wR −wL → +∞. Suppose to the con-
trary that part (iii) is false in the case wR − wL → +∞. Then there exists e ∈ (0+∞)2,
m ∈ R, and two sequences (wk)k∈N and (σ(k))k∈N with the properties wkR − wkL → +∞
for all k ∈N, wkL +wkR =m, and σ(k) is an IE for the flow-payoff parameters (ewk). Be-
low, we show that for k sufficiently large, eσ(k)L > 0 and e
σ(k)
R > 0, which, from Lemma 3,
contradicts the assumption that σ(k) is an IE.
Step 1: for k sufficiently large, wσ(k)L < w
σ(k)
L + eσ(k)L < wσ(k)R + eσ(k)R ≤ wσ(k)R . Since
wkR − wkL → +∞, (24) and inequality D ≥ (1 − δ)2 in Lemma 4 imply that, for k large
enough,
w
σ(k)
R −wσ(k)L ≥ (1− δ)
(
wkR −wkL
)− |eR − eL|
Hence, wσ(k)R −wσ(k)L → +∞, so for k large enough, wσ(k)R > wσ(k)L , and parts (i) and (ii)
of Proposition 2 imply that eσ(k)L > 0≥ eσ(k)R . Moreover, (24) and inequality D≥ (1− δ)2
in Lemma 4 imply
wσ(k)R + eσ(k)R −wσ(k)L − eσ(k)L ≥ (1− δ)
(
wkR −wkL
)− |eR − eL|
So wσ(k)R + eσ(k)R − wσ(k)L − eσ(k)L → +∞. Together with eσ(k)L > 0 ≥ eσ(k)R , this implies
Step 1.
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Step 2: For k sufficiently large,
eσ(k)R ≥ eR + δμ
(
ϒσ(k)(qq)
)
eσ(k)R + δ
∫ wσ(k)L +eσ(k)L
w
σ(k)
L
(
wσ(k)L −wσ(k)R
)
dF(θ)
Let υ ∈ ϒσ(k)(pp) ∩ ϒσ(k)(qn). Since σ(k) is an equilibrium, in state υ, both play-
ers must weakly prefer implementing n to q and one player must prefer implementing
p to n. From Lemma 2A, this means that mini∈{LR}wσ(k)i ≤ θ(υ) ≤ mini∈{LR}(wσ(k)i +
eσ(k)i ). Together with Step 1, this implies
ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(qn)⊂ {υ ∈ϒ :wσ(k)L ≤ θ(υ)≤wσ(k)L + eσ(k)L } (27)
From (27), for all υ ∈ ϒσ(k)(pp) ∩ ϒσ(k)(qn), θ(υ) − wσ(k)L ≤ eσ(k)L . Substituting this
inequality into (22), we obtain that
eσ(k)L ≤ eL + δμ
(
ϒσ(k)(qq)
)
e
σ(k)
L + δμ
(
ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(qn))eσ(k)L
and, therefore, that eσ(k)L ≤ eL/(1− δ). Since eσ(k)L > 0, the latter inequality implies that
eσ(k)L is bounded. From Step 1 and (27), for all υ ∈ ϒσ(k)(pp) ∩ ϒσ(k)(qn), 0 ≥ θ(υ)−
wσ(k)R ≥wσ(k)L −wσ(k)R . The preceding inequality and (27) imply that
∫
ϒσ(pp)∩ϒσ(qn)
(
θ(υ)−wσR
)
dμ(υ)≥
∫ wσ(k)L +eσ(k)L
w
σ(k)
L
(
w
σ(k)
L −wσ(k)R
)
dF(θ)
Substituting the above inequality into (22), we obtain Step 2.
Step 3: As k → +∞, wσ(k)L → −∞, wσ(k)R → +∞, and wσ(k)R ∼ |wσ(k)L |. As shown in
Step 1, wkR −wkL → +∞. Therefore, to prove Step 3, it suffices to show that wσ(k)L +wσ(k)R
is bounded as k → ∞. To do so, note that if we sum (22) and (23) across players and
collect the terms in the factor of wσ(k)L +wσ(k)R and eσ(k)L + eσ(k)R , we obtain(
1− δμ(ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(nn)) δμ(ϒσ(k)(nq))
δμ
(
ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(qn)) 1− δμ(ϒσ(k)(qq))
)(
wσ(k)L +wσ(k)R
eσ(k)L + eσ(k)R
)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
m− δ
∫
ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(nn)
θ(υ)dμ(υ)
eL + eR +
∫
ϒσ(k)(pp)∩ϒσ(k)(qn)
θ(υ)dμ(υ)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 
Using the notations and results in Lemma 4, the determinant of that system is D, which
is bounded away from 0 as k→ ∞. Moreover, all the coefficients of the above system are
bounded. Therefore, the solution wσ(k)L +wσ(k)R must be bounded as k→ ∞, as needed.
Step 4: For k sufficiently large, eσ(k)L > 0 and e
σ(k)
R > 0. Step 1 establishes that for k
large enough, eσ(k)L > 0. Let us now prove that e
σ(k)
R > 0. Step 3 together with the inte-
grability of F implies that
∫ wσ(k)L +eσ(k)L
w
σ(k)
L
w
σ(k)
L dF(θ) → 0. Substituting this limit in Step 2,
we obtain eσ(k)R > 0, as needed.
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Proof of Proposition 4. The strategy of the proof follows the intuition provided in
the main text after Proposition 4. We show that one can pick [δ δ¯] and [mm¯] such
that if the aforementioned sequence of EE (σ(k))k∈N exists, then w∞L < m <min{w∞L +
e∞L w
∞
R }. The latter inequalities mean that as k→ ∞, with probability arbitrarily close to
1, the state is such that players agree to repeal q (because m<min{w∞L + e∞L w∞R + e∞R })
but R prefers to repeal p, whereas L prefers to leave it in place (because w∞L <m<w
∞
R ).
Given such expectations, for k sufficiently large, eσ(k)R < 0. That is, R prefers to intervene
with q than with p, a contradiction with the assumption that σ(k) is an EE.
Step 1: There exists δ, δ¯,m, m¯ such that 0< δ< δ¯ < 1 and
wL <m< m¯ <wL +min
{
(1− δ¯)eLwR −wL − (1− δ)eR
δb
}
<wR
25 (28)
Since wR −wL > 0, for δ sufficiently close to 1, min{(1− δ¯)eLwR −wL − (1−δ)eRδb }> 0, so
by continuity, we can find δ < δ¯ < 1 for which the interval (wLwL +min{(1− δ¯)eLwR −
wL − (1−δ)eRδb }) is nonempty and, hence, we can find m and m¯ such that the first three
inequalities in (28) are satisfied. To prove the last inequality, note that wL + min{(1 −
δ¯)eLwR −wL − (1−δ)eRδb } ≤wR − (1−δ)eRδb < wR.
Step 2: Let π∞ ≡ limk→∞
∫ min{wσ(k)L +eσ(k)L wσ(k)R }
w
σ(k)
L
bR(θq)dFmkdk(θ)≥ 0. Then
w∞i =wi +
δ
1− δ(wi −m) (29)
e∞i = ei −
δπ∞
1− δ(wi −m) (30)
Since we suppose that σ(k) are EE for all k ∈N, from Lemma 3A, we have for all k ∈N,
wσ(k)i =wi + δk
∫ wσ(k)R
w
σ(k)
L
(
wσ(k)i − θ
)
dFmkdk(θ) (31)
and wσ(k)L < wL < wR < w
σ(k)
R . As dk → 0, the support of Fk becomes increasingly con-
centrated around m and from Step 1, wL <m≤m≤ m¯ < wR. So if we let k→ ∞ in (31),
we obtain w∞i = wi + δ(w∞i −m), which implies (29). From Lemma 3B, we can assume
without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that σ(k) satisfies (13), so
e
σ(k)
i = ei + δk
∫ min{wσ(k)L +eσ(k)L wσ(k)R }
w
σ(k)
L
bR(θq)
[
(θ−m)+ (m−wσ(k)i )]dFmkdk(θ) (32)
If we let k→ ∞ in (32) and use the definition of π∞, we obtain e∞i = ei + δπ∞(m−w∞i ).
Substituting (29) into the latter equation, we obtain (30).
Step 3: e∞R < 0. Summing (29) and (30) for i=L, we obtain
w∞L + e∞L =wL + eL +
δ
(
1−π∞)
1− δ (wL −m) (33)
25Recall that b is the lower bound on the function bi(· ·).
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From Step 1, m ≥ m > wL, so the right-hand side of (33) is increasing in π∞ and since
π∞ ≥ 0, (33) implies
w∞L + e∞L ≥
wL + (1− δ)eL − δm
1− δ  (34)
From Step 1, m < wL + (1 − δ)eL. Substituting this inequality into the right-hand side
of (34), we obtain w∞L + e∞L > m. Since w∞L < m < w∞R , this implies that w∞L < m <
min{w∞L + e∞L w∞R }. Using the latter inequalities in the definition of π∞, we obtain
π∞ ≥ b. From Step 1, m < wR − (1−δ)eRδb , so wR − m > (1−δ)eRδb . Substituting the latter
inequality into (30), we obtain e∞R < eR(1− π
∞
b ) < 0, where the latter inequality follows
from π∞ ≥ b.
Proof of Proposition 5. Parts A and B below prove part (i); parts C and D prove part
(ii); part E proves part (iii).
Part A: If (3) and (4) hold, there exists an equilibrium of (npq) and of (nq) that
is Pareto superior to any equilibrium of (np). Assume (3) and (4) hold, and define the
strategy profile σ∗(npq) of (npq) as follows: Under status quo n or q, in state θ (θ¯),
both players propose and accept n (q), veto q (n), and in both states, R vetoes p and L
accepts p. Under status quo p, L proposes p and accepts only p, whereas R proposes p
and accepts any proposal. The path of σ∗(npq) is as follows: Under status quo n or q,
n is implemented in state θ and q is implemented in state θ¯, and once p is implemented,
p stays in place forever.
Below, we characterize the equilibria of (np) (Step A1), show that both play-
ers strictly prefer σ∗(npq) to any equilibrium of (np) (Step A2), and show that
σ∗(npq) is an equilibrium of (npq) (Steps A3–A6). We then show that there ex-
ists an equilibrium σ∗(nq) of (nq) that has the same path as σ∗(npq) and, thus,
that also Pareto dominates any equilibrium of (np) (Step A7).
Step A1: In any equilibrium of (np), the initial status quo n stays in place forever.
Let σ be an equilibrium of (np). From (3), wL < θ, so L gets a strictly greater flow-
payoff from p than from any other policy in either state. Therefore, on the path of σ ,
once implemented, p stays in place forever. Simple algebra shows that (4) means that
in state θ¯ (and, thus, in state θ as well), R strictly prefers implementing n forever to
implementing p forever. Therefore, in either state, given continuation play σ , R strictly
prefers implementing n forever to p forever. Therefore, the path of σ stays at the initial
status quo n forever.
Step A2: Both players strictly prefer σ∗(npq) to any equilibriumof (np). The path
of σ∗(npq) implements n and q in states θ and θ¯, respectively. From (3), both players
get a strictly greater payoff from q than from n in state θ¯, so they strictly prefer the path
of σ∗(npq) to staying at n forever. Step A2 follows then from Step A1.
Step A3: Given continuation play σ∗(npq), in either state, L strictly prefers imple-
menting p to either n or q. On the path of σ∗(npq), p stays in place forever once im-
plemented, and from (3), p gives a strictly greater flow-payoff to L than any other policy
in any state.
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Step A4: Given continuation play σ∗(npq), both players prefer implementing n to
q (q to n) in state θ (θ¯). From (3), both players get a weakly greater flow-payoff from n
than from q (from q than from n) in state θ (θ¯) and the same continuation value as under
σ∗(npq), status quo n or q leads to the same outcome.
Step A5: Given continuation play σ∗(npq), in any state, R strictly prefers imple-
menting n or q to p. From Steps A1 and A2, R prefers implementing n and playing
σ∗(npq) thereafter to implementing n forever. Moreover, (4) means that in either
state, R strictly prefers n forever to p forever, which is what happens if p is implemented
and σ∗(npq) is played thereafter. Therefore, given continuation play σ∗(npq), in ei-
ther state, R strictly prefers implementing n to implementing p. From Step A4, in state θ¯,
R strictly prefers implementing q to n, so from the preceding sentence, she must strictly
prefer implementing q to p in state θ¯. Since the flow-payoff difference between q and p
is independent of θ, R also strictly prefers implementing q to p in state θ.
Step A6: σ∗(npq) is an equilibrium of (npq) and it is Pareto superior to any
equilibriumof (np). Given the preferences characterized in Steps A3–A5, the behavior
prescribed by σ∗(npq) is sequentially rational, both players strictly prefer its path to
the unique equilibrium path of (np).
Step A7: There exists an equilibrium of (nq) that is Pareto superior to any equilib-
rium of (np). By construction, under status quo n or q, σ∗(npq) never prescribes a
player to make proposal p. So σ∗(npq) defines also an equilibrium of (nq), and A7
follows from A2.
Part B: If there exists an equilibrium of (npq) or (nq) that is Pareto superior to
any equilibrium σ∗(np) of (np), then (3) and (4)must hold. Let σ(npq) be an equi-
librium of (npq) that is Pareto superior to any equilibrium of (np) (the argument
for the case of (nq) is analogous and is omitted for brevity).
Step B1: wL < θ. Suppose first that wL ≥ θ and wR ≥ θ¯. In that case, player R gets a
weakly greater flow-payoff from n than from p in either state, so there exists an equilib-
rium of (np) in which R unilaterally decides to stay forever at the initial status quo n.
This equilibrium implements the most preferred policy path of R and, thus, cannot be
dominated by any equilibrium of (npq), a contradiction. Suppose now that wL ≥ θ
and wR < θ¯. In that case, both players get a greater flow-payoff from p (n) than from n
(p) in state θ¯ (θ), so there exists an equilibrium of (np) in which players agree to im-
plement n in state θ and p in state θ¯. This equilibrium path is optimal for both players
and can, thus, not be dominated by any equilibrium of (npq), a contradiction.
Step B2: wR > θ. Suppose wR ≤ θ. Then both players get a weakly greater flow-
payoff from p than from n in either state of nature. So there exists an equilibrium of
(np) in which both players’ most preferred alternative p is implemented forever, so
this equilibrium cannot be dominated by any equilibrium of (npq), a contradiction.
Step B3: Given continuation play σ(npq), L strictly prefers implementing p to n
and p to q, so under status quo p, p stays in place forever. Step B3 follows from the
observation that since wL < θ, L gets a strictly greater flow-payoff from p than from any
other policy in either state of nature.
Step B4: Given continuation play σ(npq), R weakly prefers implementing q to p in
either state, and R strictly prefers implementing n to q and n to p in state θ. Observe first
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that q must be implemented on the path of σ(npq); otherwise (np) would admit
an equilibrium with the same path as σ(npq), so those equilibria would be payoff
equivalent. From Step B3, L must veto q under status quo p, so q must be implemented
with positive probability in some state θ∗ ∈ {θ θ¯} under status quo n. Since from Step B3,
L strictly prefers implementingp to q, Rmust weakly prefer implementing q top in state
θ∗. Since the flow-payoff difference between p and q and the distribution of future states
is independent of the current state, this must be the case in either state, which proves
the first claim of Step B4. Since q gives a strictly lower flow-payoff than p to R, the first
claim of Step B4 implies that R strictly prefers status quo q to status quo p. So it must
be that in some state θ′, with positive probability, status quo q leads to some outcome
x that R strictly prefers to p and q. So x must be n. From the first claim of Step B4, this
implies that R strictly prefers implementing n to p in state θ′. Since the flow-payoff gain
from n relative to p or q is decreasing in θ, this is true for θ′ = θ.
Step B5: Given continuation play σ(npq), R strictly prefers implementing n to p in
any state, so under status quo n, p is never implemented. Suppose Step B5 is false. Since
from Step B4, R strictly prefers n to p in θ, it must be that R weakly prefers implementing
p to n in state θ¯. Using Step B3, this means that in state θ¯, Rweakly prefers implementing
p forever to n forever, since R can unilaterally impose the latter policy path under status
quo n. Since R gets a greater flow-payoff from n than from p in state θ, and since L gets
a strictly greater flow-payoff from p than from n in either state, this implies that there
exists an equilibrium of (np) in which the initial status quo n stays in place as long as
the state stays at θ, and p is implemented at the first occurrence of θ¯ and stays in place
forever after. This equilibrium implements L’s most preferred policy path from the first
occurrence of state θ¯ onward. By assumption, L is strictly better off under σ(npq).
For that to be the case, it must be that at the initial status quo n and in state θ, σ(npq)
implements q or p with positive probability, a contradiction to Step B4.
Step B6: Under status quo n or q, p is never implemented on the path of σ(npq).
Suppose Step B6 is false. From Step B5, this implies that p is implemented with positive
probability under status quo q. From Step B4, this means that given continuation play
σ(npq), R is indifferent between implementing q or p in any state. So from Step B5,
R strictly prefers implementing n to p and to q in any state, so R must weakly prefer
staying at n forever to playing σ(npq). Since she can unilaterally impose n forever in
(np), she must weakly prefer any equilibrium of (np) to σ(npq), a contradiction.
Step B7: Given continuation play σ(npq), both players strictly prefer implementing
q to n in state θ¯. Suppose Step B7 is false. Given the flow-payoff specification, this means
that some player weakly prefers implementing n to q in either state. From Step B6, this
implies that she must weakly prefer staying at n forever to playing σ(npq). Since she
can unilaterally impose n forever in (np), she must weakly prefer any equilibrium of
(np) to σ(npq), a contradiction.
Step B8: With probability 1, status quo n stays in place in θ and is replaced by q in θ¯.
That n stays in place in state θ follows immediately from Step B4. That it is replaced by
q with probability 1 follows from Steps B5 and B7.
Step B9: Status quo q stays in placewith probability 1 in state θ¯; in state θ, it is replaced
with positive probability by n and stays in place with the remaining probability. That q
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stays in place with probability 1 in state θ¯ follows from Steps B5 and B7. Suppose now
that status quo q is never replaced by n in state θ. From Step B6, this implies that q must
stay in place with probability 1. But then both players strictly prefer implementing p
forever, so σ(npq) is not an equilibrium, a contradiction.
Step B10: Condition (3) must be satisfied. The first inequality of (3) comes from
Step B1. For the path of play described by Steps B8 and B9 to be an equilibrium, both
players must get a weakly greater (smaller) flow-payoff from n than from q in state θ (θ¯).
This means that the last three inequalities in (3) must hold weakly. Suppose to the con-
trary that the last inequality holds with equality. Then one player must be indifferent
between staying at n forever and the equilibrium path. Since she can unilaterally im-
pose n forever in the game (np), she must weakly prefer any equilibrium of (np) to
σ(npq), a contradiction.
Step B11: Condition (4) must be satisfied. Consider the strategy profile σ(np) of
(np) defined as follows: L always proposes p and accepts only p, and R proposes n
(p) and accepts only n (p) in state θ (θ¯). The path of play of σ(np) is such that n stays
in place until the first occurrence of state θ¯, at which time n is replaced by p and p stays
in place forever. Since the path of play of σ(np) implements n until the first occur-
rence of state θ¯ and never implements p, L must strictly prefers σ(np) to σ(npq),
so by assumption, σ(np) cannot be an equilibrium of (np). From Step B1, R gets a
strictly greater flow-payoff from p than from n in either state, so the actions prescribed
by σ(np) to L are subgame perfect given continuation play σ(np). The actions pre-
scribed byσ(np) toR under status quop are also subgame perfect sinceR is not pivotal
under that status quo. From Step B2, R gets a greater flow-payoff from n than from p in
state θ, so in that state, it is subgame perfect for R not to propose p and to veto p un-
der status quo n. The only remaining case is when the status quo is n and the state is θ¯.
Since σ(np) is not an equilibrium, it must be that R’s actions in that case are not sub-
game perfect. This means that in state θ¯, R must strictly prefer staying at n forever than
switching to p forever. Simple algebra shows that this condition is equivalent to (4).
Part C: If all equilibria of (npq) are Pareto superior to any equilibrium of (np),
then (3), (4), and (5) must hold. Suppose all equilibria of (npq) are Pareto superior to
any equilibrium of (np). We already know from part B that (3) and (4) must be satis-
fied. So to prove part C, it suffices to prove (5). To do so, consider the following strategy
profile σ ′(npq). Under status quo p, both players propose p, L accepts only p, and R
vetoes only q. Under status quo n, both players propose n, R accepts only n, andL vetoes
only q. Under status quo q, both players proposes p, and L accepts only p, whereas R
accepts any policy. By construction, the path of play of σ ′(npq) implements n forever.
Since either player can unilaterally impose that outcome in the game (np), σ ′(npq)
is not Pareto superior to any equilibrium of (np), so by assumption, it cannot be an
equilibrium. In what follows, we assume that (5) is violated, we characterize players’ in-
centives given continuation play σ ′(npq) (Step C1), and we show that σ ′(npq) is an
equilibrium (Step C2), a contradiction.
Step C1: If condition (5) is violated, then given continuation play σ ′(npq), in ei-
ther state, R prefers implementing n to p to q, whereas L prefers implementing p to q
to n. Note first that since status quo q and p both lead to policy p, and since p gives
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both players a greater flow-payoff than q, both players prefer implementing p to q in
any state. Moreover, (4) implies that in either state, R prefers implementing n forever to
p forever, which is what happens if n and p are implemented, respectively, given con-
tinuation play σ ′(npq). Therefore, R prefers implementing n to p to q. To complete
the proof, it remains to show that L prefers implementing q to n in either state, given
continuation play σ ′(npq) or, equivalently, that L prefers implementing q today and
p forever to implementing n forever. Simple algebra shows that this is equivalent to (5)
being violated.
Step C2: If condition (5) is violated, σ ′(npq) is an equilibrium. It is straightforward
to check that given the preferences characterized in Step C1, σ ′(npq) prescribes either
veto players to accept (reject) a proposal whenever it gives her a greater (lesser) contin-
uation payoff, and it prescribe either proposer to propose the policy that gives her the
greatest continuation payoff among those accepted by the veto player, as needed.
Part D: If (3), (4), and (5) hold, any equilibriumof (npq) or (nq) is strictly Pareto
superior to any equilibrium of (np). Assume (3), (4), and (5). The strategy profile
σ∗(npq) defined in part A is an equilibrium that is strictly Pareto better than any equi-
librium of (np). So it suffices to show that any equilibrium of (npq) and (nq)
must have the same path as σ∗(npq). In Steps D1–D6 below, σ is an arbitrary equilib-
rium of (npq).
Step D1: Given continuation play σ , in either state, status quo p always stays in place
and L strictly prefers implementing p to n or q. From (3), p gives a strictly greater flow-
payoff to L than any other policy in any state. So R strictly prefers staying forever at p to
any other policy path, and she can unilaterally impose that continuation path once p is
the status quo.
Step D2: Given continuation play σ , in either state, R strictly prefers implementing n
to p. Once n is the status quo, R can unilaterally impose to stay at n forever. Since σ is
an equilibrium, this implies that R must weakly prefer implementing n today and play-
ing σ thereafter to implementing n forever. Moreover, from (4), in any state, R strictly
prefers implementing n forever to p forever, which, from Step D1, is what happens if p
is implemented and σ is played thereafter. Step D2 follows then by transitivity.
Step D3: p is never implemented on the path of σ . From Step D1, p is never imple-
mented under status quo n. So if Step D3 is false, it must be that (i) in some state θ′, p
is implemented with positive probability under status quo q and that (ii) in some state
θ′′, q is implemented with positive probability under the initial status quo n. Note that
(i) implies that given continuation play σ , in state θ′, R weakly prefers implementing
p to implementing q. Since the flow-payoff of q relative to p is independent of θ, this
must also be true in state θ′′. Likewise, (ii) implies that R weakly prefers implementing
q to n in state θ′′. By transitivity, R weakly prefers implementing p to n in state θ′′, a
contradiction with Step D2.
Step D4: Given continuation play σ , in state θ, both players strictly prefer implement-
ing n to q, so in state θ, status quo n or q leads to n. Suppose to the contrary that given
continuation play σ , some player i prefers implementing q to n in state θ. Since the flow-
payoff of n relative to q is decreasing in θ, i prefers implementing q to n in both states, so
from Step D3, i weakly prefers implementing q forever to implementing n forever. But
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(4) means that in any state, R strictly prefers implementing n forever to p forever and,
thus, to q forever. So i must be L. Simple algebra shows that (5) implies that in state θ, L
prefers implementing n forever to implementing q today and p forever after, so L must
prefer n forever to q forever, a contradiction. The second claim in Step D4 follows from
the first claim and Step D3.
Step D5: Given continuation play σ , in state θ¯, both players strictly prefer implement-
ing q to n, so in state θ¯, status quo n or q leads to policy q. From Step D4, in state θ, status
quos n and q lead to the same outcome. Moreover, in state θ¯, from (3), both players get
a strictly greater flow-payoff from q than from n. Therefore, given continuation play σ ,
both players strictly prefer implementing q to n. The second claim in Step D5 follows
from the first claim and Step D3.
Step D6: σ has the same path as σ∗(npq). This step follows directly from Steps D3,
D4, and D5.
StepD7: Any equilibriumof (nq) has the same path as σ∗(npq). This step follows
directly from the proof of Steps D4 and D5.
Part E: For any (wLwReLeR), there exists (δθ θ¯π) such that (3), (4), and (5) hold.
Pick θ and θ¯ so that (3) holds. Simple algebra shows that (4) and (5) can be rewritten as
π <
wR−(1−δ)θ¯−δθ
δ(θ¯−θ) andπ <
(1−δ)eL+wL−θ
δ(θ¯−θ) . The latter two inequalities are satisfied for some
π ∈ (01) whenever their right-hand sides are strictly positive, which is the case if and
only if
θ¯−wR
θ¯− θ < δ<
eL +wL − θ
eL
 (35)
Note that θ¯−wR
θ¯−wL < 1 and is independent of θ, and the right-hand side of (35) is 1 for θ =
wL. So for any θ¯ satisfying (3), by continuity one can pick θ satisfying (3) and (35).
A.3 Proofs for the model of Section 5
Lemma 5. Consider the model of Section 5. For every strategy profile σ , let V σi denote
the continuation payoff for player i ∈ {LR} of implementing policy x ∈ {npq} in some
period t with state (θ(t) v(t))= (θ v) ∈R× [01] until the next period in which the state
is redrawn, given continuation play σ . There exist (wLwReLeR) ∈R4 such that, for any
equilibrium strategy profile σ and for all i ∈ {LR}, θ ∈R, and v ∈ [01],(
1− δ(1− v))[V σi (θ vp)− V σi (θ vn)]= θ− (1− v)wi − vwσi(
1− δ(1− v))[V σi (θ vp)− V σi (θ vq)]= (1− v)ei + veσi  (36)
Proof. We use Notation 1 with the exception that a state of the world υ ∈ ϒ now also
includes the realization of the volatility v. For any strategy profile σ , all υ ∈ ϒ, and s ∈
{npq}, let Xσ(υ s) denote the policy outcome in a period in which the state of the
world is υ, the status quo is s, and players play σ . By definition of V σi ,
V σi (θ vp)− V σi (θ vn)
= θ−wi + δ
{
(1− v)[V σ(θvp)− V σ(θvn)]
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+ v
∫
υ∈ϒ
[
V σ
(
θvXσ(υp)
)− V σ(θvXσ(υn))]dμ(v)}
=
θ− (1− v)wi − v
{
wi − δ
∫
υ∈ϒ
[
V σ
(
θvXσ(υp)
)− V σ(θvXσ(υn))]dμ(v)}
1− δ(1− v) 
If we set wσi equal to the term inside the curly brackets in the numerator of the above
fraction, then wσi depends on neither θ nor v, which proves the first line of (36). The
proof for the second line of (36) follows an analogous argument and is omitted for
brevity.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let σ be an equilibrium. For q to be implemented on some
equilibrium path, some player i must weakly prefer implementing q to p in some state
(vθ) given continuation play σ . From Lemma 5, we have V σi (θ vq) ≥ V σi (θ vp) in
some state (vθ) ∈ [01)×R if and only if eσi < 0 and v > eiei−eσi . So if e
σ
L ≥ 0 and eσR ≥ 0,
for all (vθ) ∈ [01)×R, V σi (θ vp) > V σi (θ vq), and the first part of Proposition 6 holds
trivially for v¯ = 1. Suppose now that eσi < 0 for some i and let v¯ ≡ eiei−eσi < 1. Then from
Lemma 5, for all v < v¯ and all θ ∈ R, both players weakly prefer implementing p to q in
state (vθ), so q is not implemented on path in such states. When v > v¯ and when θ is
sufficiently large, i’s most preferred policy given continuation play σ is q, and j prefers
to accept q under status quo n, so q is implemented, as needed.
Consider a sequence of c.d.f.s (Hk)k∈N such that for all k ∈N, Hk(vθ)=Gk(v)F(θ),
where Gk has full support and tends to the degenerate distribution that puts probability
1 on v = 1 as k → ∞. Suppose the second claim of Proposition 6 is false, that is, q is
never implemented in some equilibrium for any Hk. This means that for all k ∈N, there
exists an equilibrium σ(k) such that eσ(k)L ≥ 0 and eσ(k)R ≥ 0. Together with (36), the
latter inequalities imply that for all θ ∈R and k ∈N, both players strictly (weakly) prefer
implementing p to q given continuation play σ(k) when v ∈ [01) (when v= 1). So σ(k)
never prescribes players to propose q when v ∈ [01), and we can assume that this is
true as well when v = 1. Since Gk puts probability 0 on v = 1, this deviation from σ(k)
does not affect the continuation payoff parameters wσ(k) and eσ(k), and the modified
σ(k) is still an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to a
subsequence of (σ(k))k∈N such that wσ(k) and eσ(k) converge to some w∞ and e∞.
Let us now show that the corresponding subsequence of (σ(k))k∈N converges. For
almost all (θ v), θ − (1 − v)wi − vw∞i = 0. Together with (36), this implies that for any
such (θ v), i strictly prefers to implement p to n for all k sufficiently large or i strictly
prefers to implement n to p for all k sufficiently large. An analogous statement holds
between n and q, and between p and q. So for almost all (θ v), the action prescribed by
σ(k) to veto player i and, therefore, to proposer i, must be pure and constant in k for k
sufficiently large.
Note finally that by continuity, limk→∞(σ(k)) must be an equilibrium of  for the
limit c.d.f. The limit of (Hk(vθ))k∈N as k → ∞ puts probability 1 on v = 1, so the limit
game is equivalent to the game considered in Proposition 4, and by construction, q is
never implemented on path, so it is an EE. Since δ can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1
and since F can be chosen arbitrarily, we obtain a contradiction with Proposition 4.
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A.4 Example for statements made in Section 4.1
Suppose wL ≤wR and eL < eR. Below, we build a simple environment with three states
θ1 < θ2 < θ3 in which an IE σ exists such that wσL >w
σ
R and e
σ
L < 0< e
σ
R. This equilibrium
demonstrates that when eL < eR, the players i and j in Proposition 2 can be R and L, re-
spectively (see claims at the end of Section 4.1 and in Footnote 16). In the case wL =wR,
this example also demonstrates that when eL = eR, for some distribution of the shock,
there exists an IE (see the claim in Footnote 17). In these cases, there also obviously ex-
ists an EE in which players never disagree between n and p (i.e., wσL = wσR = wL = wR),
so IE and EE can coexist (see the claim in Footnote 18), and in this case the EE is clearly
Pareto better than the IE.
The putative equilibrium path of the IE σ is as follows. In state θ1, policy makers
agree to implement n irrespective of the status quo. A sufficient condition for this is
that θ1 <mini(wσi ). In state θ2, n stays in place, q is replaced by n, and p stays in place.
A sufficient condition for this is that wσR < θ2 < w
σ
L, θ2 < mini(w
σ
i + eσi ), eσL < 0, and
eσR > 0. In state θ3, p and q stay in place and n is replaced by q (p) when L (R) is the
proposer. A sufficient condition for this is thatwσR <w
σ
R+eσR < θ3 and wσL+eσL <wσL < θ3.
The aforementioned equilibrium conditions can be summarized as
{
θ1 <w
σ
R < θ2 <w
σ
R + eσR < θ3
θ1 < θ2 <w
σ
L + eσL <wσL < θ3
(37)
To make sure such an equilibrium exists, we must compute the continuation payoff pa-
rameters (wσi  e
σ
i ) using the aforementioned equilibrium path, and check that they sat-
isfy (37). To do so, observe that according to the putative equilibrium path, status quo p
(q) (n) leads to policy n being implemented in state θ1, to policy p (n) (n) being imple-
mented in state θ2, and to policy p (q) (q w.p. bL and p w.p. bL) being implemented in
state θ3. Therefore,
{
eσi = ei + δπ2
(
θ2 −wσi
)+ δπ3eσi
θ−wσi = θ−wi + δπ2
(
θ2 −wσi
)+ δπ3bLeσi 
Solving these equations for (eσi w
σ
i ), we obtain
eσi =
(1− δπ2)ei + δπ2θ2 − δπ2wi
1− δπ2 − δπ3 + δ2π2π3(1− bL)
wσi =
(1− δπ3)wi − δπ3eibL − δθ2π2 + δ2θ2π2π3(1− bL)
1− δπ2 − δπ3 + δ2π2π3(1− bL)

For simplicity, fix δ = 1 and bL = 1 in the above expression (if we get the desired strict
inequality for δ = 1 and bL = 1, by continuity, we have them for δ and bL close enough
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to 1). Then we get⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
wσi =wi +
π2
π1
(wi − θ2)− π3
π1
ei
eσi =
(1−π2)ei +π2(θ2 −wi)
π1
= ei + π3
π1
ei − π2
π1
(wi − θ2)
wσi + eσi =wi + ei
The equilibrium conditions in (37) become⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θ1 <wR + π2
π1
(wR − θ2)− π3
π1
eR < θ2 <wR + eR < θ3
θ1 < θ2 <wL + eL <wL + π2
π1
(wL − θ2)− π3
π1
eL < θ3
(38)
We can ignore the outer inequalities, as fixing the remaining parameters, one can always
pick θ1 small enough and θ3 large enough such that the remaining inequalities in (38)
are also satisfied. The inner inequalities can be rewritten as
wR − π31−π3 eR < θ2 <wR + eR
θ2 <min
{
wL + eLwL − 1−π2
π2
eL
}
=wL − 1−π2
π2
eL
Clearly, one can find (wRwLeReLπ2π3 θ2) such that these inequalities are satisfied.
In particular, set wL =wR = 0. Then these inequalities require − π31−π3 eR < θ2 <−
1−π2
π2
eL,
which can be satisfied as long as π31−π3 eR <
1−π2
π2
eL. The latter inequality is satisfied for
some π2 and π3 such that π2 +π3 < 1 as long as eR < eL, as needed.
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